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NOTE
NOT ALL THOSE WHO WANDER ARE LOST: THE
PATHWAY TOWARDS AMERICAN DATA
PRIVACY LAW
"Arguing that you don't care about the right to privacy because you have
nothing to hide is no different than saying you don't care about the
freedom of speech because you have nothing to say."
Edward Snowden'
I.

INTRODUCTION

Even in today's digital age of "Big Data," 2 one still hopes for privacy
and autonomy with regard to the use and consumption of his or
her personal information, as is true with other facets of sensitive
information. 3 In reality, an American data subject 4 lacks the necessary
tools to prevent online actors from the collection, usage, and disclosure of
most of his or her personal data within the digital marketplace.s
The constitutionally-founded right to privacy has long been argued,
even before the turn of the twentieth century. 6 To this day, it remains
1. Edward Snowden (u/SuddenlySnowden), REDDIT (May 21, 2015, 2:25 PM),
https://www.reddit.com/r/IAmA/comments/36ru89/justdaysleft-tokillmass-surveillanceunder
/crglgh2.
2.

Big Data, LEXICO, https://www.lexico.com/definition/bigdata (last visited May 18, 2020)

(defining Big Data as "[e]xtremely large data sets that may be analysed [sic] computationally to reveal
patterns, trends, and associations, especially relating to human behavior and interactions"); see Joseph
A. Tomain, Online Privacy & the FirstAmendment: An Opt-In Approach to DataProcessing, 83 U.

CIN. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (2014) (describing features of the "Big Data era," including the "exponential
increase in the amount and types ofdata collected ...

mostly without the consent of individuals whose

data is being processed").
3. See Tomain, supra note 2, at 16-18. Informational privacy protects both the dignity of the
data subject and his or her individual autonomy. Id. at 16; see also Parks and Recreation: The

Pawnee-EagletonTip off Classic (NBC television broadcast Oct. 3, 2013) (quoting Ron Swanson:
"People ought to have the right to be left alone.").

4. Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 4, § 1, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 (EU) [hereinafter GDPR]
(defining data subject as one "who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference
to an identifier such as a name, a identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one

or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social
identify of that natural person"). For purposes of this Note, this terminology will be adopted.
5. See Tomain, supra note 2, at 1, 12-14.
6. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193, 193,
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highly-contested because while our Constitution does not explicitly state
a right to privacy, the Supreme Court has repeatedly determined that
variations of the right are derived from penumbras of other rights
guaranteed in the Constitution. Landmark cases that demonstrate this
perceived right to privacy include Griswold v. Connecticut,8 Roe v.
Wade,9 and Lawrence v. Texas,`0 to name a few." The overarching goal
connecting cases involving this implicit right to privacy is to protect an
individual's autonomy in making personal decisions about his or her body
12
and private life without constant fear of governmental interference.
While numerous decisions have been made stating implicit findings ofa
right to privacy within the Constitution, one would have a difficult time
finding this exact terminology.13 How is it then, that this right has been
declared by the Court to exist, absent direct constitutional language?14
Of course, a seemingly straightforward explanation would be that
there can be no singular definition of privacy, thus escaping explicit
constitutional capture. 5 As "privacy" itself is somewhat of an umbrella
term birthed out of societal necessity, it avoids succinct placement.16
When viewed from this train of thought, with the understanding that
privacy is born out of societal necessity, the need for informational
privacy comes clearly into focus. 1 7 Just as the European Union ("EU")
195(1890).
7. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965); see U.S. CONST. amends. IV, V,
XIV. See generally William M. Beaney, The ConstitutionalRight to Privacy in the Supreme Court,

1962 SUP.CT.REv. 212,214,215-51 (reviewingearly Supreme Courtcases determiningthe existence
of a right to privacy as it relates to the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments).
8. 381 U.S. at 484-85 (finding that the use of contraceptives "concerns a relationship lying
within the zone ofprivacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees").

9. 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (concluding that the right to privacy includes qualified abortionrelated decisions).
10. 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003) (holding that two consenting adults engaging in homosexual
activity "are entitled to respect for their private lives" and that "[the State cannot demean their
existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime").
11. See generally Beaney, supra note 7, at 214-51 (discussing the development of the right to
privacy through Supreme Court cases).
12. Students: Your Right to Privacy, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/other/students-your-right-

privacy (last visited May 18, 2020).
13.

See Emily Linn, Note, A Look into the Data Privacy Crystal Ball: A Survey ofPossible

Outcomes for the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield Agreement, 50 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1311, 1315-16
(2017).
14. See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy ofPrivacy, 154 U. PA. L. REv. 477, 479-82 (2006); see
also leuan Jolly, Data Protectionin the UnitedStates: Overview, WESTLAWNEXT, https://l.next.west

law.com/Document/I02064fbdlcb6l1e38578f7ccc38dcbeeNiew/FullText.html?contextData(sc.D
efault)&transitionType=Default&firstPage--true&fromAnonymous-true for an in-depth overview of
the competing interests between sectoral and state privacy laws (last visited May 18, 2020).
15. Solove, supra note 14, at 480, 484, 486 (quoting Judith Jarvis Thompson, The Right to
Privacy, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 272, 272 (Ferdinand D.

Schoeman ed., 1984) ("'Perhaps the most striking thing about the right ofprivacy,' philosopher Judith
Jarvis Thomson has observed, 'is that nobody seems to have any very clear idea what it is."').
16. Solove, supra note 14, at 480, 484.
17. See id. at 484.
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made data privacy to be a fundamental right, it too is necessary for the
United States to adopt a more appropriate analysis of its own." While
there truly may not be one singular definition ofprivacy-as "[p]rivacy
is a chameleon that shifts meaning depending on context"-inaction is not
an option. 19 As technology advances, so too must data privacy rights.2 0
This Note's argument rests on the straightforward understanding that
technological advancements have born issues which were not
contemplated at the time of the Constitution's drafting.2 1 In keeping up
with new-world advancements, acceptance of the penumbra theory is
necessary for a foundational understanding of informational privacy
protections. 2 2For clarification purposes, Roe v. Wade held that, although
the Constitution does not explicitly provide the right to privacy, the right
to personal privacy derives from the Fourteenth Amendment.2 3 The
Fourteenth Amendment, 2 4 inrelevant part, states:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
and immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.

25

The United States' data protection laws continue to be behind the
times in comparison to other countries due to the lack of comprehensive
data privacy regulation. 2 6The EU, for example, enacted the General Data
Protection Regulation ("GDPR") as of April 2016, which aims to give
18. See Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 8, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012
O.J. (C 326) 391.
19. Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions,50 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1202
(1998); see infra Part IV (proposing a comprehensive data privacy framework).
20.

See Robert S. Peck, Extending the ConstitutionalRight to Privacy in the New Technological

Age, 12 HOFSTRA L. RE. 893, 898, 900-01 (1984) ("The changing world around us has an important
place in determining constitutional doctrine.").
21. See Warren& Brandeis, supra note 6, at 195 ("Recent inventions and business methods call
attention to the next step which must be taken for the protection of the person, and for securing to the

individual what Judge Cooley calls the right 'to be let alone."') (internal citation omitted).
22. See generally Jolly, supra note 14 (identifying various industries with data privacy
regulations and the varying degrees thereof).
23. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973). Noting that:
In varying contexts, the Court or individual Justices have, indeed, found at least the roots
of that right in the First Amendment ... ; in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments ... ; in the
penumbras ofthe Bill ofRights, Griswoldv. Connecticut, 381 U.S., 484-485; in the Ninth
Amendment ..

; or in the concept of liberty guaranteed by the first section of the

Fourteenth Amendment, see Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). These
decisions make it clear that only personal rights that can be deemed "fundamental" or
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-25
(1937), are included in this guarantee ofpersonal privacy.
Id.
24. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
25. Id.
26. Linn, supra note 13, at 1316.
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fundamental control to EU citizens and residents over their personal
data.2 7 Comparatively, forced to rely on a myriad of piecemeal legislation,
an American data subject is left with an inefficient and insecure federal
framework for data privacy. 2 8 Currently, some sectoral laws have been
adopted while other areas are left up to self-regulation.2 9 Consequently
and unsurprisingly, public distrust in this self-regulatory regime continues
to rise, ultimately stemming from the insurmountable pitfalls of the
current piecemeal privacy patchwork.3 0
Part II of this Note begins by examining the various ineffective U.S.
data privacy frameworks involving sectoral lawmaking and the preferred
method of self-regulation as "best practices." 3 1 The United States'
sentiment towards privacy is then juxtaposed with that of the EU's, which
elevates data privacy to fundamental right status.3 2 Part II continues by
discussing America's constitutional underpinnings for the right to privacy
33
and takes a look at the technology industry's opinion on the matter. Part
II concludes with an examination of standard privacy notice practices and
determines whether "idealized consent" is accurately dubbed as "legal
fiction" or is something entirely obtainable. 3 4Part III looks at the
developing landscape of federal data privacy law by giving a side-by-side
analysis of Senator Ron Wyden's bill, Intel's proposal, and the California
Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 ("CCPA"), and further displays why these
models are insufficient to tackle present issues.3 5 Lastly, Part IV proposes
a framework for federal legislation and outlines the individual rights to be
enshrined therein.3 6
THE TRANSATLANTIC DIVIDE: DIFFERING SENTIMENTS TOWARDS
DATA PRIVACY

II.

To better grasp the current state of data privacy, it is first worth
37
mentioning the difference between "cybersecurity" and "data security."
Most of the time, cybersecurity is used interchangeably with data

27.

GDPR, supranote 4, at arts. 1, 99 (declaring the fundamental right to protection ofpersonal

data and identifying the effective date ofMay 25, 2018, respectively).
28.

Linn, supranote 13, at 1316.

29. Id.
30. See Jolly, supra note 14 (discussing dozens of federal and state privacy laws); Ian Sherr,
Facebook, Cambridge Analytica and Data Mining: What You Need to Know, CNET (Apr. 18, 2018,
5:10 PM), https://www.cnet.com/news/facebook-cambridge-analytica-data-mining-and-trump-whatyou-need-to-know ("The honeymoon between the tech industry and the government is over.").

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

See infra Part I.A.
See infra Part H.B.
See infra Parts I.C-D.
See infra Part I.E.
See infra PartIII.
See infra Part IV.
See Jeff Kosseff, Hamiltonian Cybersecurity, 54 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 155, 170 (2019).
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security. 3 However, cybersecurity is much broader than data security, as
it encapsulates both network and system security measures.3 9
Cybersecurity law "promotes not only (1) confidentiality but also (2)
integrity and (3) availability (known in cybersecurity circles as the 'CIA
Triad')." 4 0 References to data protection have become "particularly
prominent" following the GDPR's enactment. 4 1 Data protection law
closely relates to cybersecurity law as it also requires companies to adopt
procedural safeguards and holds them accountable for data breaches.4 2
This Note focuses on data protection as it relates to the average American
data subject's expectation of informational privacy. 4 3 While this Note's
argument revolves around informational privacy, the legislative end is
inextricably tied to cybersecurity concerns, and, as such, certain
provisions relating strictly to cybersecurity are included.4 4
The current rate that international data trades at and the speed at
which personal information may flow to bridge the transatlantic space
continues to cause worry among American technology firms. 45 Significant
uncertainties surround international data transfer as legal bodies clash and
the stakes have become such that failure to enact comprehensive
legislation is at an all-time high.4 6 A study conducted in March of 2016
by the U.S. Department of Commerce found that "$260 billion in digital
services trade moves between the United States and the EU annually." 4 7
To draw comparisons to the reigning principals driving privacy law,
Nikolaus Peifer, Director of the Institute for Media Law and
Communications Law at the University of Cologne, explains that
"[e]ncryption is based to some extent on the idea that the law won't protect
your rights, so you have to protect yourself.... The European tradition
is that the law will protectyou."4 8
Whereas the EU views data privacy law as a reflection of the
fundamental rights of its citizenry, the United States' informational
privacy law is founded within the marketplace. 4 9 This type of bilateral
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id.
Id
Id
Id at 170-71.
Id at 171.
See infra Parts I.C, IIE, IV.

44.

See infra Part IV.

45.

Robert Levine, The Student Who Stood upfor Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2015, at 4,

https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/11/business/intemational/behind-the-european-privacy-rulingthats-confounding-silicon-valley.html.

46. See id
47. Penny Pritzker& Andrus Ansip, Making a Difference to the World's DigitalEconomy: The
TransatlanticPartnership,TRADEOLOGY (Mar. 11, 2016), https://blog.trade.gov/2016/03/11/makin
g-a-difference-to-the-worlds-digital-economy-the-transatlantic-partnership.
48. Levine, supra note 45.
49. Paul M. Schwartz& Karl-Nikolaus Peifer, TransatlanticData PrivacyLaw, 106 GEO. L.J.

115, 132 (2017) ("Unlike the EU's data subject, U.S. law does not equip the privacy consumer with
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self-interest driven marketplace scheme places emphasis on personal
information commoditization and leaves U.S. lawmaking to follow the
This can be further evidenced by a quick
doctrines of fairness.so
5
used in data privacy related statutes. As a
language
the
of
observation
matter of fact, U.S. privacy statutes place the individual immediately
within marketplace relations through the use of such statutory language as
"consumer, customer, or 'subscriber' of telecommunications."52
The presumptive permissibility of the free flow of information and
the subsequent processing of any personal data is a widely accepted
53
principle in the U.S., unless laws otherwise limit its application.
Insufficient data protection continues on through a hodgepodge statutory
regime, both at the state and federal levels, with the main drawback being
the necessary presence of a "horror story" to further shock growth into
existence. 5 4This is best exhibited by the historic tendency of swift
legislative data privacy action only after demonstrations of extreme,
55
abusive data practices.
Beginning with a national inspection, Subpart A explores the
56
fragmented sectoral data privacy regime throughout the United States.
57
Subpart B then discusses the EU's GDPR and its global implications.
Subpart C discusses the various implicit constitutional findings of the
right to privacy and congressional regulatory authority on the matter.s
Subpart D examines the various viewpoints of those in the tech industry:
Subpart D.1 finds fault in the tech giants' call for reformed governmental
surveillance, 5 9 Subpart D.2 focuses on Facebook's privacy violations 6as0
being the quintessential rallying cry for the need of legislative change,
and Subpart D.3 calls attention to Tim Cook's address at the Fortieth
Privacy
Conference of Data Protection and
International
Commissioners. 6 1 Lastly, Subpart E tackles the issue of whether idealized
62
consent is truly legal fiction or an obtainable reality.
fundamental constitutional rights; rather she participates in a series of free exchanges involving her
personal information.").

50. Id. ("Personal information is another commodity in the market, and human flourishing is

furthered to the extent that the individual can maximize her preferences regarding data trades.").

51. See id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 135.
54. Id at 136.
55. PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL VALUES, AND
PUBLIC POLICY 199 (1995) (noting the importance of "outside events" in opening the "policy
window" for privacy); Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 49, at 136.

56.

See infra Part I.A.

57.

See infra Part H.B.

58.
59.

See infra Part I.C.
See infra Part I.D.1.

60.
61.
62.

See infra Part II.D.2.
See infra Part H.D.3.
See infra Part H.E.
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Shortcomings ofSectoral andPiecemeal Lawmaking

The United States, failing to adopt an all-encompassing rights-based
federal data privacy law like that of the EU, has chosen to rely on a system
of "industry norms, codes of conduct and the consumer marketplace to
protect personal privacy."63 This is due, in part, to the varying views and
sentiments towards the right to privacy existing between the two entities.6 4
The EU understands data privacy to be a fundamental human right,
protecting individuals from unfair corporate data collection. 65 The United
States, in contrast, follows a more fragmented approach to data privacy
regulation-passing laws across specific target areas, while leaving the
rest up to self-regulation.6 6 These optional guidelines and frameworks
created by governmental agencies can often "overlap, dovetail, and
contradict one another" due to the disjointed nature of the coverage
and the general preference for self-regulation to be considered
"best practices."
In an attempt to protect certain sensitive personal information,
narrowly-carved, federal privacy-related laws and regulations safeguard
the collection and use of particular categories of information,
such as financial information, health information, and electronic
communications.68 Examples of federal privacy laws include: the Federal
Trade Commission Act, 6 9 the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 70 the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act, 7 1 the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 72 and

the Children's Online Privacy Protection Rule.
63.

James M. Assey, Jr. & Demetrios A. Eleftheriou, The EU-U.S. Privacy Safe Harbor:

Smooth Sailing or Troubled Waters?, 9 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS: J. COMM. L. & POL'Y 145, 149-50

(2001).
64.

Linn, supra note 13, at 1315-18.

65. Jasmine McNealy & Angelyn Flowers, Privacy Law and Regulation: Technologies,
Implications, and Solutions, in PRIVACY IN A DIGITAL, NETWORKED WORLD 189, 198-99 (Sherali

Zeadally & Mohamad Badra eds., 2015).
66. Linn, supra note 13, at 1317 ("When regulation of the private sector must occur, there is a
strong presumption in favor of self-regulation as the 'least intrusive and most efficient means,'
preferring soft laws that permit, but do not compel, private actors' participation."); see FED. TRADE
COMM'N, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS iii(1998), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/fil
es/documents/reports/privacy-online-report-congress/priv-23a.pdf

67.
68.
69.

Jolly, supra note 14.
Id.
15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2018). The Federal Trade Commission Act established the Federal

Trade Commission in effort of prohibiting unfair or deceptive business practices, the likes of which
have been applied to both online and offline transactions. Jolly, supra note 14.

70.

15 U.S.C.

§

1681 (2018) (governing the collection and use of certain financial information,

such as consumers' credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity and general capacity used in

determining credit eligibility).
71. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2018) (regulating the interception and disclosure of electronic
communications).

72.
73.

18 U.S.C.
15 U.S.C.

§ 1030 (2012) (regulating computer tampering).
§§ 6501-6505 (2012) (imposing certain requirements

on operators of websites

directed towards children under the age of thirteen).
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Understanding the general operating principles of the Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC")-revolving around a responsive nature rather than
a preventative one-reveals that the federal regulations in place for data
privacy do not address the fundamental underlying issue: "unjustified,
mass data collection itself." 74 At the state level, "[a]ll 50 states, the District
of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands" have some
varying form of breach notification law involving personally identifiable
information. 7 As a result of not having one single comprehensive federal
law, the United States has hundreds of data privacy laws across the
country. 7 California alone has twenty-five state privacy laws, including
the CCPA.n According to Cheryl Wang, writing for the Columbia
Undergraduate Law Review, "it is precisely this dispersive and
disorganized nature of different states' regulations that creates a highly
inefficient and undefined system for protecting privacy" throughout the
United States. 7 8 With no two states having the same informational privacy
and security laws, 7 9 the current regulatory framework lacks the broad
accountability necessary to provide companies with the requisite
incentives to protect consumer data.8 0
8
In February of 2019, 121 data brokers that collect and sell data
about Vermont residents registered with the Vermont Secretary of State
following the enactment of the country's first law governing the data
broker industry. 82 Vermont attempted to bring this industry-shrouded in
74. Cheryl Wang, Information Privacy and Data Security Laws: An Ineffective Regulatory
Framework, COLUM. UNDERGRADUATE L. REv. (Oct. 31, 2017), http://blogs.cuit.columbia.edu/culr/
2017/10/31/information-privacy-and-data-security-laws-an-inefficient-regulatory-framework.

75.

Pam Greenberg,

Security Breach Notification Laws, NCSL

(Sept.

29, 2018),

http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/security-breach-

notification-laws.aspx.
76.

Data ProtectionLaws ofthe World, DLA PIPER, https://www.dlapiperdataprotection.com/

index.html?t-law&c=US (last updated Jan. 2020).
77. Id.
78.
79.
(Sept. 10,
labama.
80.

81.

Wang, supra note 74.
Geoff Scott, Internet Privacy Laws Across America: A Guide to All 50 States, TERMLY
2018), https://termly.io/resources/articles/data-privacy-laws-by-state-a-complete-guide/#A
Wang, supra note 74.

9 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9,

§ 2430(4)(A)

(West 2019). A data broker is a "business, or unit or

units of a business, separately or together, that knowingly collects and sells or licenses to third parties
the brokered personal information of a consumer with whom the business does not have a direct
relationship." Id There are three types of data brokers:
(1) There are people search sites, where users can input a piece of data, such as a
name ... and get personal information on that person either for free or for a small
fee .... [(2)] There are data brokers that focus on marketing.. . . They develop

dossiers on individuals which can be used to tailor marketing..

..

[(3)] Lastly, there

are data brokers such as ID Analytics that offer risk mitigation products to verify
identities and help detect fraud.
Yael Grauer, What Are 'DataBrokers,'and Why Are They Scooping up Information About You?,
VICE (Mar. 27, 2018, 10:00 AM), https://www.vice.com/enus/article/bjpx3w/what-are-databrokers-and-how-to-stop-my-private-data-collection.
82. Steven Melendez, A Landmark Vermont Law Nudges over 120 Data Brokers out of the
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secrecy-out into the sunlight; the ultimate "goal was to give residents
one public database where they can find clear information about all
companies that sell their data ..

"8

Data is equivalent to power in

today's "digital economy," as "[m]ulti-national corporations have made
farming data from monitoring everything we do-what we buy, who we
talk to, where we take vacation-a core business strategy." 84
In May of 2014, after it conducted an in-depth study on nine
individual data brokers, the FTC released its 110-page report.8 5 The report
lists several recommendations, including: "legislation requiring
consumer-facing entities to disclose that they share data with brokers, and
allow them to opt out," and a call for "data brokers to create a centralized
mechanism, such as a portal, to provide consumers access to their
data. . . .."86 Unfortunately, Congress has yet to follow through on the
problem of data privacy. 8 7 The FTC's report-calling for transparency,
opt-out mechanisms, and informatory consumer tools-is directly in line
with this Note's proposed solution: comprehensive federal data
privacy regulation.
B.

What Is the GDPR Exactly?

The EU's GDPR was formally adopted in 2016 and officially went
into effect on May 25, 2018.89The aim of the GDPR is to lay down rules
relating to data protection with regard to the processing of personal data. 90
This regulation finds power of enforcement through the protection of
Shadows, FAST COMPANY (Mar. 2, 2019), https://www.fastcompany.com/90302036/over-120-databrokers-inch-out-of-the-shadows-under-landmark-vermont-law. In 2017, one data giant, Acxiom
"provided up to 3,000 attributes on 700 million people," and the following year "the number was
10,000, on 2.5 billion consumers." Steven Melendez & Alex Pasternack, Here Are the DataBrokers
Quietly Buying and Selling Your Personal Information, FAST COMPANY (Mar. 2, 2019),
https://www.fastcompany.com/90310803/here-are-the-data-brokers-quietly-buying-and-sellingyour-personal-information.
83. See Douglas MacMillan, DataBrokers Are Selling Your Secrets. How States Are Trying to

Stop Them., WASH.POST (June 24,2019,5:54 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/
06/24/data-brokers-are-getting-rich-by-selling-your-secrets-how-states-are-trying-stop-them

("Until

recently, Randy Koloski had never heard of Amerilist, a small business 25 miles north of Manhattan.
But for $150, Amerilist makes available a list of information on 5,000 people that includes Koloski's
name, home address, age, religion, education level and income.").
84. Bernard Marr, Where Can You Buy Big Data? Here Are the Biggest Consumer Data
Brokers, FORBES (Sept. 7, 2017, 12:28 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2017/09/07/
where-can-you-buy-big-data-here-are-the-biggest-consumer-data-brokers/#5f7775e76c27.
85. FED. TRADE COMM'N, DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY i (May 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/data-brokerscall-transparency-accountability-report-federal-trade-commission-may-2014/140527databrokerrepo

rt.pdf.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 49-54; Grauer, supra note 81.
Grauer, supra note 81.
See infra Part IV.

89.

GDPR, supra note 4, at art. 99(2).

90.

Id. at rec. 2.
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fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons and the free
movement of such personal information.9 1 Differing from the United
States' market-based theory, an EU data subject enjoys near full control
and ownership as personal data privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed
92
by the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights. For purposes of
93
this Note's objective, the topic of consent shall be discussed in further
detail in Part III as it pertains to U.S. law.94
Since the GDPR's enactment, data subjects globally have noticed a
bombardment of consent notifications immediately upon arrival onto a
new website pertaining to the website's respective cookie policies,
95
regardless of the geographic location of the operating individual. This
seemingly-innocuous interruption of web usage is thanks to the global
implications of the GDPR. 96 Article 7 of the GDPR lays out the conditions
for consent, stating that "[w]here processing is based on consent, the
controller shall be able to demonstrate that the data subject has consented
to processing of his or her personal data." 9 7 The Article 7 provisions work
together to create the GDPR's consent regime: An individual must give
clear and affirmative consent to the use of their data in the
purported manner. 9 8
"Cookie" is the term given to a packet of data that is sent from a
website to a user's computer and then sent back to the website "without
changing or altering it." 99 The purposes of website cookies can vary, but
they boil down to tailoring a website to fit a particular consumer's needs
and personal interests.00For example, a retailer may use cookies to keep
91. Id. at rec. 2-3.
92. Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 8, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J.
(C 364) 391 ("l. Everyone has the right to the protection ofpersonal data concerning him or her. 2.
Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the consent ofthe person
concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right of access to data
which has been collected concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified. 3. Compliance with
these rules shall be subject to control by an independent authority.").
93. GDPR, supra note 4, at art. 7.

94. See infra Part HI.
THE
95. See Jack Schofield, What Should I Do About All the GDPR Pop-ups on Websites?,
0
GUARDIAN(July 5, 2018, 11:01 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/askjack/2 18/julO5/
what-should-i-do-about-all-the-gdpr-pop-ups-on-websites.
96. GDPR, supra note 4, at art. 7(1); see Schofield, supra note 95.
97. GDPR, supra note 4, at art. 7(1); id. at art. 4(2) ("'Processing' means any operation or set

.

of operations which is performed on personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by
automated means, such as collection, recording, organisation [sic], structuring, storage, adaptation or
alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making
available, alignment or combination, restriction, erasure or destruction."); id. at art. 4(7)
("'[C]ontroller' means the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body which, alone
or jointly with others, determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data . .

For the purposes of this Note, this terminology will be adopted.
98. Id. at art. 7.
99.

What Are Cookies?, NORTON, https://us.norton.com/internetsecurity-how-to-what-are-

cookies.html (last visited May 18, 2020).
100. What Are Cookies?, WEBWISE (Oct. 10, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/webwise/guides/abo
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0 Without the
track of items in a consumer's "shopping cart."o
website and
the computer recognizing each other in this fashion, online shopping
would not be possible. 102
So then how is it that cookies relate to the GDPR? 103 Simply put, a
cookie can be used to uniquely identify an individual; thus classifying it
as personal data and bringing it within the purview of the GDPR. 104 It is
important to remember that all of this is done in an effort to remain
compliant with the GDPR's consent obligationsos-which require data
processors to gain clear, unequivocal acceptance and consent to cookie
usage, in addition to providing opt-out capabilities to those that have
previously given consent. 10 6
Additionally, not only does the GDPR place the initial decision in
the hands of the EU data subject, but it also gives him or her a few avenues
of recourse when it comes to incorrect or irrelevant information.10 7 An EU
citizen seeking to correct misinformation may exercise his or her Article
16 Right to Rectification, which states that "[t]he data subject shall have
the right to obtain from the controller without undue delay the rectification
of inaccurate personal data concerning him or her."o Alternatively, the
EU citizen wishing for the deletion of irrelevant collected information can
exercise his or her Article 17 Right to Erasure, which states that "[t]he
data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller the erasure
of personal data concerning him or her without undue delay and the
controller shall have the obligation to erase personal data without undue
delay where one" of any of the provided for situations occur. 109
ut-cookies.
101. What Are Cookies?, supra note 99.
102.

Id. ("Without cookies," a consumer's shopping cart "would reset to zero every time you

clicked a new link on the site.").
103. Laura Vegh, Cookies Consent Under the GDPR, EU GDPR COMPLIANT (Feb. 14,2018),
https://eugdprcompliant.com/cookies-consent-gdpr; see Schofield, supra note 95; see also GDPR,
supra note 4, at rec. 30 ("Natural persons may be associated with online identifiers provided by their
devices, applications, tools and protocols, such as intemet protocols address, cookie identifiers or
other identifiers such as radio frequency identification tags. This may leave traces which, in particular
when combined with unique identifiers and other information received by the servers, may be used to
create profiles of the natural persons and identify them.") (emphasis added).

104. See Vegh, supra note 103.
105. See GDPR, supra note 4, at art. 7(2).
106. GDPR, supra note 4, at arts. 7(2)-(3); see GDPR, supranote 4, at art. 21 ("[Article 21(1):]
The data subject shall have the right to object, on grounds relating to his or her particular
situation ... . [Article 21(2):] Where personal data are processed for direct marketing purposes, the
data subject shall have the right to object at any time to processing of personal data concerning him
or her for such marketing, which includes profiling to the extent that it is related to such direct
marketing.").
107. See infra text accompanying notes 108-09.

108.
109.

GDPR, supra note 4, at art. 16.
Id. at art. 17 (listing the following scenarios where a data subject may exercise her right to

erasure: (1) the personal data is no longer necessary in relation to the original collection purpose, (2)
the data subject withdraws consent, (3) the data subject objects pursuant to Article 21(1) or Article

21(2), (4) the personal data has been unlawfully processed, (5) the personal data must be erased for
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C.

The ConstitutionalFoundationfor CongressionalAction

'

The right to privacy, originally dubbed the "right to be let alone," has
been broadened to encompass things of both intangible and tangible
nature as the progression of society-in ways of political, social, and
economic change-has enticed the need for such expansions.o Just as
technological advancements shape society, they also alter our
understanding of constitutional liberties."' Seminal cases like Meyer v.
114
Nebraska,12 Pierce v. Society of Sisters,' 13 Griswold v. Connecticut,
1
6
Planned Parenthoodv. Casey,"'5 and Obergefell v. Hodges' have all
been pivotal in the shaping and recognition of societal expectations of
privacy." 7 The argument for an implicit right to privacy is further
bolstered when individual amendments are examined, not as restrictions
1
on the government, but as protections given to the individual."
compliance with a legal obligation, and (6) the personal data has been collected in relation to the offer
of information society services). Opponents of an American right to be forgotten fear that it would
come at the cost of First Amendment liberties, such as free speech. Hillary C. Webb, Note, "People
Don't Forget": The Necessity ofLegislative Guidance in Implementing a U.S. Right to Be Forgotten,

85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1304, 1309 (2017). However, it need not be so black and white as Viviane
Reding, Vice President of the European Commission, stated that "[t]he right to be forgotten is of
course not an absolute right ...

. Neither must the right to be forgotten take precedence over freedom

of expression or freedom of the media." Viviane Reding, Vice President, European Comm'n, EU
Justice Comm'r, The EU Data Protection Reform 2012: Making Europe the Standard Setter for
Modem Data Protection Rules in the Digital Age (Jan. 22, 2012) (transcript available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release SPEECH-12-26_en.htm). The constitutionality of the right to
rectification and the right to erasure go beyond the scope of this Note, but their mention is relevant
due to California's adoption of the right to erasure, albeit limited, in the California Consumer Privacy

Act of 2018. See infra Part III.C.
110. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 6, at 193 ("Gradually the scope of these legal rights
broadened; and now the right to life has come to mean the right to enjoy life, -the right to be let
alone; the right to liberty secures the exercise of extensive civil privileges; and the term 'property'
has grown to comprise every form of possession -intangible, as well as tangible.").
111. See Tim Sharp, Right to Privacy: ConstitutionalRights & Privacy Laws, LIVE SCL (June

12, 2013), https://www.livescience.com/37398-right-to-privacy.html (stating that "the boundaries of
personal privacy" have changed "largely due to social media and an atmosphere of'sharing"').

112.

262 U.S. 390, 400-01 (1923) (concluding that education and the acquisition of knowledge

are matters of utmost importance, the determination of which is within parental privacy).

113. 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (protecting the fundamental right of a parent to control the
upbringing and education of a child under his or her control).
114. 381 U.S. 479, 480, 484-86 (1965) (finding that the intimate choice between husband and
wife to use contraception lies within the zone of privacy emanating from the penumbras of the Bill of

Rights).
115. 505 U.S. 833, 846-48 (1992) (reaffirming a woman's constitutional right to terminate her
pregnancy, founded within the "substantive liberties protected by" the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment).

116.

135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604-05, 2607-08 (2015) (extending the holding of Lawrence v. Texas,

which held in favor of an implicit right to privacy between two consenting homosexual adults, to the
conclusion that the fundamental right to marry is guaranteed to same-sex couples by the Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment).
117. See Sharp, supra note 111 (recognizing that Griswold v. Connecticut was the first case to
create a zone of privacy).

118.

See id. (listing the individual protections afforded by the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth,

and Fourteenth Amendments).
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To clarify this idea of negative liberties, a plain reading of the First
Amendment reveals that it protects the privacy of one's beliefs, but this is
through the negative lens prohibiting the government from establishing a
national religion or impeding on the free exercise thereof.' 19 In the same
fashion, the Third Amendment "protects the privacy of the home against
the use of it for housing soldiers" through the governmental restriction on
quartering soldiers in private homes without the owner's consent.1 20 The
Fourth Amendment protects the privacy of one's self through the
restriction against unjustifiable governmental searches and seizures. 12 1
The Fifth Amendment grants the right against self-incrimination, thus
limiting governmental authority over the compulsion of private or
personal information.1 22 Additionally, the Ninth Amendment has been
construed as validation that the Bill of Rights should not be read as an
exhaustive list of privacy protections.1 2 3 Equally important, the
Fourteenth Amendment, with the power of the Due Process Clause, has
been understood as protecting all rights previously discussed while being
fully attributable to the states.1 24
The Supreme Court, in Reno v. Condo, squarely upheld Congress'
constitutional authority to regulate, at least to a certain extent, privacy
under the Commerce Clause.1 2 5 Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the U.S.
Constitution, otherwise referred to as the Commerce Clause, grants
Congress the authority to regulate channels of commerce among the
states, with foreign nations, and with the Indian Tribes. 12 6 Congress is
authorized to regulate the "channels of interstate commerce;
instrumentalities, peoples, and things used in interstate commerce; and
other activities substantially related to interstate commerce." 12 7 Recalling
the rate at which data trades internationally, Townsend Feehand, Chief
Executive ofJAB Europe, commented that "[i]nternational data transfers
28
are the lifeblood of the digital economy."

119. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
120. Id. amend. III; Sharp, supra note 111.
121. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Sharp, supra note 111.
122.
123.

U.S. CONST. amend. V; Sharp, supra note 111.
U.S. CONST. amend. IX; Sharp, supra note 111.

124. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597, 2604-05
(2015); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846-47 (1992); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965); Pierce v. Soc'y ofSisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 399-401 (1923).
125. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 148 (2000) ("[The] sale or
release [of personal, identifying information] in interstate commerce is [] a proper subject of
congressional regulation.").
126. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Mallory Ursul, Note, The States' Role in Data Privacy:
California ConsumerPrivacyAct Versus Dormant Commerce Clause, 52 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 577,

587(2019).
127. Ursul, supra note 126, at 587.
128. Levine, supranote 45, at 4.
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This is where another distinction must be made between
cybersecurity and data privacy.12 9 Critics of federal cybersecurity
legislation argue that an expansive view of the Commerce Clause, as it
applies to regulating the free flow of information, would exceed the
Framers' intended scope. 3 0 In reality, even when interpreted narrowly,
the Commerce Clause covers cybersecurity as most data are stored on
cloud services, all of which may have zero connection to a physical
location. 13 1 From this it follows that securing said data, even when
performed without commercial motive, falls within the scope of the
Commerce Clause.1 32 This understanding rests on the interwoven nature
of cybersecurity and data privacy, and the role that this data would
nonetheless ultimately play on interstate commerce.1 33 The procedural
safeguards that cybersecurity-and data protection in particular-would
require inevitably impact the commercial flow of information; because
cybersecurity is inextricably tied to data protection, procedural safeguards
of the former are substantially related to the ultimate desire for the
latter.1 34 It is for this reason that "[r]egulating how companies secure and
protect this valuable commodity [would] inevitably regulate how the data
flows across state lines."' 3 5 As the judiciary has recognized, there can be
little doubt that "[a]s both the means to engage in commerce and the
method by which transactions occur, 'the internet is an instrumentality
and channel of interstate commerce."' 1 3 6 With this understanding,
"regulation of the Internet [thus] impels traditional Commerce
Clauseconsiderations."l 37
Thanks to the pervasiveness of the Internet and the "gestation of the
'always online' society," the scale of data farming has risen exponentially
without regard to global borders.1' Not only does precedent suggest the
constitutional underpinning for an argument in favor of a right to data
privacy through the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth
Amendments, but the rate at which data trades, both interstate and
internationally, also suggests congressional authority by means of
Commerce Clause regulation.1 3 9
129. See supra Part H (explaining that cybersecurity is a broader concept than data security).
130. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Kosseff, supra note 37, at 179-80.
131. Kosseff, supra note 37, at 180-81.
132. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Kosseff, supranote 37, at 180-81.
133. See Kosseff, supra note 37, at 179, 180-81.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 181.
136. United States v. Trotter, 478 F.3d 918, 921 (8th Cir. 2007).
137. Am. Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 173 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("The Internet is
more than a means of communication; it also serves as a conduit for transporting digitized goods,
including software, data, music, graphics, and videos.") (emphasis added).
138.

Marr, supra note 84.

139. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; id amends. II, IV, V, IX, XIV; Pritzker & Ansip, supra note
47 (noting that the trade of goods and services between the United States and Europe totals $2.7
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D. Tech Giants and Data Privacy:
Wanting to Have Their Cake andEat It Too
The growth of technology and the ease at which the digital
environment may be accessed "presents serious and unresolved issues
with respect to personal privacy and the dignity it seeks to secure."1 4 0 Of
course, certain governmental agencies have made strides in ways of
protecting certain sensitive information, but a greater degree of data
security is necessary. 14 1 Should an all-encompassing rights-based data
privacy regime take force, consumers can attain a greater sense of
confidence as to where their data is going and what it is being used for. 142
1. Tech Giants' Acknowledgement of Privacy Rights
On December 9, 2013, tech giants Google, Facebook, Microsoft,
Apple, Yahoo, AOL, LinkedIn, and Twitter published an open letter
calling to reform global surveillance practices in light of the then recent
NSA leaks. 14 3 In addition to the open letter, the companies collectively
listed five principles (with a sixth principle added later) for governments
to adhere to while conducting surveillance. 14 4 While these principles were
strictly directed towards governmental surveillance, this Note argues that
they should be equally applicable to private actors because to do otherwise
would go against the main objective: protecting privacy interests against
powerful actors, regardless of whether they are private or public.14 5
The first principle is "Limiting Governments' Authority to Collect
Users' Information." 14 6 Here, the tech giants call for limiting surveillance
for specific reasons and only for lawful purposes and advise against
government pursuit of bulk data collection. 14 7 This principle aims to
billion a day); see Ursul, supra note 126, at 582, 587.
140. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 579 (2011).
141. See Jolly, supra note 14 for a discussion on various federal and state laws addressing U.S.
data protection.
142. See generally GDPR, supra note 4, at art. 7 (stating the necessary underlying principle of
unambiguous, affirmative consent to data collection and processing practices).
143. Hilary Lewis, Tech Giants Pushfor Government Surveillance Reform, HOLLYWOOD REP.

(Dec. 9, 2013, 9:25 AM), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/tech-giants-push-governmentsurveillance-664097; see Ewen Macaskill & Gabriel Dance, NSA Files: Decoded: What the
Revelations Meanfor You., THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 1, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/world/inte

ractive/2013/nov/01/snowden-nsa-files-surveillance-revelations-decoded#section/1
public concern following Snowden's shocking NSA expos6).
144.

Tomain, supra note

2,

at

18; Putting Principles into Action,

SURVEILLANCE, http://www.reformgovernmentsurveillance.com/principles
2020).
145. Tomain, supra note 2, at 18, 19.
146.

PuttingPrinciplesinto Action, supra note 144.

147.

Id.
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safeguard the trust founded within the Internet by protecting individual
privacy rights, the likes of which are violated if consent is not first freely
given. 14 8 However, it is irrelevant whether it is a public or private data
collector; 14 9rather, what is important are the privacy concerns individuals
have in understanding the scope and purpose of data collection and
processing in correlation to the consent provided.15 0
The second principle is "Oversight and Accountability." 1 5 ' This
principle would require a clear and comprehendible statutory framework
to provide unequivocal notice to processors about the scope of a
government's ability to "collect or compel the production of
information.""'
Similarly, the third principle, "Transparency About
Government Demands," notes that transparency is of utmost importance
in determining the permissible power and scope of surveillance
programs.' 5 3 An opt-in regulatory regime, the necessity of which is
discussed in Part IV of this Note, applied to both the private and public
sector would safeguard against privacy infringement by providing
material information about an institution's data practices.15 4
The fourth principle, "Respecting the Free Flow of Information,"
was included in light ofthe then newly-imposed GDPR. 5 5 This principle
states that the free flow of data is essential to today's digital economy and
governments should not only permit, but also promote, the free flow
thereof1 5 6 Here, the tech giants maintain that private actors should not be
subject to the same restrictions as the government.1 5 7 However, it is not
the nature of the entity that matters-whether it be private or publicrather, what matters are the data subject's privacy interests in being free
of mass data collection and the subsequent creation of detailed data
profiles without user consent.'5 8
Within the fifth principle, "Avoiding Conflicts Among
Governments," the reform calls on governments to propose a robust, allencompassing international privacy regime to better protect a corporation
from conflicting laws.' 5 9 Lastly, the sixth principle, "Ensuring Security
148.

Id.; see Tomain, supra note 2, at 19.

149.

Neil M. Richards, The Dangers ofSurveillance, 126 HARv. L. REv. 1934, 1935 (2013)

("Public and private surveillance are simply related parts of the same problem, rather than wholly
discrete. Even if we are ultimately more concerned with government surveillance, any solution must
grapple with the complex relationships between government and corporate watchers."); Tomain,
supra note 2, at 19.
150. See Richards, supra note 149, at 1935; Tomain, supra note 2, at 19.
151. Putting Principlesinto Action, supra note 144.

152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Tomain, supra note 2, at 19; see infra Part IV.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Tomain, supra note 2, at 19; PuttingPrinciples into Action, supra note 144.
PuttingPrinciplesinto Action, supra note 144.
Tomain, supra note 2, at 19-20; see PuttingPrinciplesinto Action, supra note 144.
Tomain, supra note 2, at 19-20; see PuttingPrinciplesinto Action, supra note 144.
PuttingPrinciplesinto Action, supra note 144.
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and Privacy Through Strong Encryption," calls for improved encryption
across the board to guard individuals, corporations, and governments
against breaches. 16 0 While all six principles were directed against
governmental intrusion, the argument fails as it ignores the interwoven
relationship between the private and public spheres: "[T]hey use the same
technologies and techniques, they operate through a variety of
public/private partnerships, and their digital fruits can easily cross the
public/private divide." 6 1
2. Facebook Under Strict Governmental Scrutiny
Whether a corporation chooses the opt-out or opt-in model of
consent, 16 2 the FTC retains enforcement capabilities through general
consumer protection laws prohibiting "[u]nfair methods of competition in
or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting commerce."1 6 3 Currently, the only guidance pertaining to
obligations in respect to disclosures of personal information follows an
opt-out regime, holding that a financial institution may not disclose
categorized personal information to a nonaffiliated third party1 6 4 unless:
(1) such disclosure has been made to the data subject,1 6 5 (2) the consumer
has been given an opportunity to object,1 6 6 and (3) the consumer has been
apprised of her right to exercise nondisclosure. 16 7
In November of 2011, Facebook settled a claim brought by the FTC
asserting Facebook had deceived consumers through its terms and
conditions agreement in promising that its users' information would be
kept private. 16 8 Instead, this information was shareable and made
public.1 6 9 The FTC's eight-count complaint against Facebook was an
attempt to ensure Facebook's privacy policies aligned with the promises
made to its consumers. 17 0 Most importantly, Facebook was required to
160. Id.
161.
162.

Richards, supra note 149, at 1958; see Tomain, supra note 2, at 19-20.
See FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 66, at 15-16.

163. 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(a)(1)-(2) (2012).
164. 15 U.S.C. § 6802(b)(1) (2012).
165. Id. §6802(b)(1)(A).
166. Id. §6802(b)(1)(B).
167. Id. §6802(b)(1)(C).
168. Facebook Settles FTC Charges That It Deceived Consumers by Failingto Keep Privacy
Promises, FED. TRADE COMM'N (Nov. 29, 2011), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2011/11/facebook-settles-fc-charges-it-deceived-consumers-failing-keep.

169.
170.

Id.
Id. The FTC complaint identified the following instances where Facebook's actions did not

line up with privacy promises made: (1) Facebook ensured certain information, such as friends lists,
would remain private but this information was instead public without consumer notification; (2) users
were assured third-party applications installed would only have access to relevant information, but
instead, third parties could access almost all personal information; (3) users were assured they could

restrict sharing by changing their privacy settings to "friends only," but their data was still shared
with third-party applications; (4) Facebook did not certify the security of third-party applications as
claimed; (5) Facebook shared personal information with advertisers, which it promised it would not
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take several steps to ensure promised data privacy and protection,
"including giving consumers clear and prominent notice and obtaining
consumers' express consent before their information is shared beyond the
privacy settings they have established." 1 7 The FTC can intervene and
require an opt-in consent model if it's deemed necessary to prevent further
deceptive business practices, as seen here. 17 2 Public concern continued to
grow following Facebook's March 16, 2018, statement regarding its data
breach, leaving an estimated 87 million users exposed to
Cambridge Analytica.1 7 3
The March statement declared that Aleksandr Kogan created an
application called "thisisyourdigitallife," which asked users to give
consent to and login with their Facebook credentials in order to utilize its
personality prediction features. 17 4 Paul Grewal, Vice President & Deputy
General Counsel of Facebook, stated that "[a]lthough Kogan gained
access to [users' private information] in a legitimate way and through the
proper channels that governed all developers on Facebook at that time, he
did not subsequently abide by our rules. By passing information on to a
third party. . . he violated our platform policies." 7 Data privacy
concerns then led to a Senate hearing in April of 2018, where senators of
the House Energy and Commerce Committee called into question the
current atmosphere of data privacy and the possible need to regulate
Facebook with governmental oversight. 7 6 Ed Markey, a Democratic
Senator from Massachusetts, stated that "[t]he day of reckoning for
American privacy has arrived. . . Facebook now has to deal with how
much people understand about how vulnerable all their information
is and how few protections are on the books. So I do think this is a
legislating moment."1 77

do; (6) even if a user deleted her account all personal information remained accessible; and (7)
Facebook did not comply with the EU-U.S. Safe Harbor Program. Id.
171. Id.
172.

Id.

173. See Sherr, supra note 30.
174. Id.
175.

Paul Grewal, Suspending CambridgeAnalyticaandSCL Groupfrom Facebook, FACEBOOK

(Mar. 16, 2018), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/03/suspending-cambridge-analytica.
176. Todd Shields et al., Senators Tell Facebook CEO the Days ofSelf-Regulation May End,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 11, 2018, 4:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-0411/senators-tell-facebook-ceo-the-days-of-self-regulation-may-end.
177.

Id.; see also Mike Isaac& Sheera Frenkel, Facebook's Woes Rise as Hackers Expose Data

of50 Million Users, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2018, at Al8 ("'Breaches don't just violate our privacy.
They create enormous risks for our economy and national security,' Roit Chopra, a commissioner

of the Federal Trade Commission, said in a statement. 'The cost of inaction is growing, and we need
answers."'); Louise Matsakis & Issie Lapowsky, Everything We Know About Facebook's Massive
Security Breach, WIRED (Sept. 28, 2018, 3:03 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/facebook-securitybreach-50-million-accounts (discussing a later Facebook security breach that may have affected 90
million users).
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Routinely becoming the bearer of bad news, Facebook's privacy
integrity has further proven insufficient as the social network disclosed on
September 28, 2018, that an unprecedented security breach had impacted
nearly 50 million users, with an additional 40 million users considered to
be at risk. ` 8 Facebook continues to be a prime example of the need for
congressional action in ways of data protection and security.1 7 9 Uniquely,
this breach differs from the Cambridge Analytica incident in that
Cambridge Analytica used a then legitimate application to access and
siphon data from Facebook users after affinmative consent, while the more
recent breach actually allowed hackers to illegitimately take full control
of impacted accounts.'s 0 Mark R. Warner, 8' 1 a Democratic Senator from
Virginia, commented on this breach as being yet another "sobering
indicator that Congress needs to step up and take action to protect the
1 82
privacy and security of social media users."'
3. Cook Praises the GDPR
At the Fortieth International Conference of Data Protection and
Privacy Commissioners"3 on October 24, 2018, Tim Cook gave an
impassioned speech praising the EU in ways of individual data privacy
protection.1 8 4 It was with admiration for the EU in mind that he called for
similar rights to be enshrined by U.S. legislation. 8' Cook asserted that
"[t]echnology's potential is, and always must be, rooted in the faith people
have in it," and pointed out that at the current rate of data misuse, public
6
trust, and in turn, technological advancement will falter.8
Cook called for the world to follow the EU's lead-with its
enactment of the GDPR-to create a similar all-encompassing rights-

178.
179.

Matsakis & Lapowsky, supra note 177.
See Isaac & Frenkel, supra note 177.

180. Compare Michael Riley et al., Understanding the Facebook-CambridgeAnalytica Story:
QuickTake, WASH. POST (Apr. 9, 2018,1:27 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/under

standing-the-facebook-cambridge-analytica-story-quicktake/2018/04/09/OfI8d91c-3clc-I1e8-955b(explaining that the data
7d2el9b79966_story.htrnl?noredirect-on&utmterm=.f9dla7d66881
accessed by Cambridge Analytica focused on a user's basic profile information, as well as the "liked"
information of consenting users and their "Facebook Friends"), with Isaac & Frenkel, supra note 177
(identifying the methodology the hackers used to exploit a feature in Facebook's code and how it
allowed them the ability to take control of exposed accounts).
181.

MARK

R.

WARNER:

US

SENATOR

FROM

THE

COMMONWEALTH

OF VIRGINIA,

https://www.warner.senate.gov/public/index.cfm (last visited May 18, 2020).
182. Isaac & Frenkel, supra note 177.
183. Debating Ethics: Dignity and Respect in Data Driven Life, 40TH INT'L CONF. DATA
PROTECTION & PRIVACY COMMISSIONERS, https://www.privacyconference20l8.org/en (last visited

May 18,2020).
184. Jonny Evans, Complete Transcript, Video ofApple CEO Tim Cook's EU Privacy Speech,
COMPUTERWORLD (Oct. 24, 2018, 3:27 AM), https://www.computerworld.com/article/3315623/secu

rity/complete-transcript-video-of-apple-ceo-tim-cooks-eu-privacy-speech.html.
185. See id
186. Id.
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based data privacy law in the United States. 8 7 With the support of Apple
behind him, the comprehensive federal legislation he calls for would be
founded upon the following four principles: (1) data minimization
(companies should either de-identify consumer data or not collect it at
all); 1 8 8(2) consumers should always have the right to know what data is
being collected, to what extent, and for what purpose;' 89 (3) the data
subject's right to access their personal data stored with the collector
should be respected; 190 and (4) everyone has a right to security of their
data.'9 This so-called "right to security," as Cook puts it, is a clear
acknowledgment that proper data privacy legislation cannot come about
without accompanying data security provisions. 192 Data privacy law
requires cybersecurity standards capable of providing American data
subjects with the proper tools necessary to hold covered entities
accountable for data security failures.1 93
Following Cook's speech, Acxiom, one of the nation's leading data
brokerages, offered support for the call for federal legislation. 194
Acxiom-which originally opposed the previously mentioned Vermont
law on data brokers-took the time to clarify its distaste: "What everyone
must understand is that the cost of compliance for all businesses in the US
will be punitive and detrimental to our economy if everyone must adhere
to multiple and independent state laws versus a singular, united set of

187.

Chris Baraniuk, Tim Cook Blasts 'Weaponisation'ofPersonalData and PraisesGDPR,

BBC (Oct. 24, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-45963935. Cook's endorsement was far
more wholehearted than Mark Zuckerberg's expressed sentiment during the April 2018 senate

hearings, when he stated Facebook would support regulation "if it's the right regulation." Issie
Lapowsky, Get Ready for a Privacy Law Showdown in 2019, WIRED (Dec. 27, 2018, 7:00 AM),
https://www.wired.com/story/privacy-law-showdown-congress-2019.

188. Tim Cook (@tim cook), TWITTER (Oct. 24, 2018,5:57 AM), https://twitter.com/timcook
/status/1055035541996089344.
189. TimCook(@tincook), TWITTER (Oct. 24,2018,5:57 AM), https://twitter.com/tim cook/
status/1055035543933849600.
190. Tim Cook (@tim cook), TWITTER (Oct. 24,2018,5:57 AM), https://twitter.com/timcook/
status/1055035546244911105. Here Cook advocates for the individual data subject's right to correct
and delete personal data collected. Id. As previously discussed, the Right to Rectification and Right
to Erasure go beyond the scope of this Note's proposed solution. See infra Part IV. However, the
mention of which is noteworthy as it indicates industry willingness. See Tim Cook (@tim cook),
supra.

191. Tim Cook (@timcook), TWITTER (Oct. 24, 2018,2:57 AM), https://twitter.com/timcook/
status/1055035549512294401.
192. See Kosseff, supra note 37, at 171, 178 (describing the close relation between data
protection and cybersecurity and noting that the CCPA, which is aimed at data protection, also

implements cybersecurity obligations).
193. Id.
194. Jack Purcher, Data Broker Acxiom Goes on the Offense Agreeing with Apple's CEO,
ThoughDoesn't Want TheirIndustry Overly Scrutinized, PATENTLYAPPLE (Jan. 18, 2019,6:02 AM),
https://www.patentlyapple.com/patently-apple/2019/01/data-broker-acxiom-goes-on-the-offenseCook stated:
agreeing-with-apples-ceo-though-dont-want-their-industry-overly-scrutinized.html.
"Right now, all of these secondary markets for your information exists in a shadow economy that's

largely unchecked-out of sight of consumers, regulators and lawmakers." Id. (emphasis omitted).
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Not only does the current framework of

fragmentary federal legislation coupled with meticulously crafted local
laws leave the consumer wildly unprotected, but it also creates undue
burdens upon companies attempting to remain compliant. 19 6
E.

Consent.Legal Fiction or UntappedPotential?

The CCPA and the Intel Data Privacy Proposal, to be discussed
further in Part HI, both follow opt-out models of consent, and as such,
diverge from the main goal of the GDPR and of this Note's solution: data
subjects' unbridled control over their own personal information.1 97 With
the FTC's authority over data privacy, stemming from the ability to
prevent unfair or deceptive business acts or practices,1 9 8 consumer
uncertainty must be alleviated through the adoption of the opt-in model of
consent. 199 In their article, Transatlantic Data Privacy Law, Paul
Schwartz and Karl-Nikolaus Peifer comment that "[i]n the uncertain
privacy landscape of the United States, the FTC has stopped companies
from tricking consumers, overpromising privacy, and engaging in
unexpected and unreasonable data practices." 2 0 0 However, the article calls
this "idealized consent" mere "legal fiction." 2 0 1 The article goes on to
explain Lon Fuller's definition of legal fiction as the "reconciliation ofa
'legal result with some expressed or assumed premise."' 20 2 This is based
on the assumption that the imaginary reasonable consumer does take the
time to read privacy policies. 203 Nevertheless, this is a dangerous
generalization to make as it fails to take into account the impact of
continuous privacy reminders in the aggregate, as well as undervalues the
benefits the FTC has to gain from a uniform notice-and-consent model.2 04
The most common privacy notices today are unwieldy, overly
complicated with legalese, and focus more on statutory requirements
rather than informing the consumer.205 To promote consumer
understanding, the conversation must turn on whether corporations are
195. Id.
196. See id
197. See infra Parts III, IV.
198. Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 49, at 149. The FTC currently operates in the realm of
privacy protection under the presumption that a reasonable data subject maintains certain privacy

policy expectations. Id. These expectations-being either explicitly or implicitly promised by ways
of industry norms-can be enforced under the FTC's authority to prevent unfair or deceptive acts
affecting commerce. Id

199.

See infra Part IV.

200.

Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 49, at 150.

201. Id at 149-50.
202. Id (quoting LON L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 51 (1967)).
203.

Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 49, at 150.

204. See id at 148.
205. Florian Schaub et al., Designing Effective Privacy Notices and Controls, IEEE INTERNET
COMPUTING, May-June 2017, at 70, 71, https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7927931.
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206
providing consumers with necessary decision-making information. In
order to create effective privacy notices, the three requirements of
2 07
(1) relevancy, (2) actionability, and (3) understandability must be met.
A privacy notice is relevant if it provides a data subject with information
pertaining to the current transactional context, so as to better understand
the instant privacy implications. 2 0 8 Actionability is met when data subjects
are given the ability to freely give or withhold consent based upon explicit
expressions of choice rather than an assumption based on prior or
aggregated user usage. 2 0 9 Understandability, a straight-forward concept,
is lost in the privacy policies of today as they often bombard the data
2 10
Instead, it must
subject with an unnecessary amount of information.
to
comprehendible
easily
notices
privacy
make
to
priority
be a
211
the non-lawyer.
The current practice of presenting privacy policies in their entirety
leads to "information overload" and is simply an ineffective way of
informing data subjects. 2 1 2 Instead, privacy policies can be complemented
with brief privacy notices, formed within the boundaries of relevancy,
actionability, and understandability, and tailored to specific transactional
contexts. 2 1 3 These privacy notices-remaining short and specific-would
require a data subject to rely less on interpretation and focus more on
creating informed decisions as to the boundaries and implications of his
or her consent.2 14

III.

DATA PRIVACY: WHO IS DRIVING THE DIscUSSION?

The need for constitutional data privacy rights that provide real
2 15
protection on the Internet is becoming more and more apparent. The
"Internet pervades all aspects of life" and the current disorganized system
of data privacy law will no longercut it.2 16 This Part examines Senator

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

See id. at 73.
Id at 72.
Id.
Id.
Id at 72, 73.
Id. at 73.
See id. at 71, 73.
Id. at 72, 73.
Id. at 73.

215.

Elbert Lin, PrioritizingPrivacy: A ConstitutionalResponse to the Internet, 17 BERKELEY

TECH. L.J. 1085, 1107 (2002).
216. Id. at 1107-08.
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Wyden's bill,2 17 Intel's Proposal, 2 1 8 and the CCPA, 2 19 in order to give
examples of differing viewpoints on the best way forward-as well as
highlight the fundamental issues with each approach.2 2 0
Critics of a comprehensive federal data privacy framework argue
overregulation would interfere with the development and innovation of
domestic data markets. 2 21 These concerns stem from the United States'
view that data privacy is a purely commercial endeavor, as the "processing
of personal data constitutes quite a considerable part of the entire market
sector." 2 22 Because of this fact, "[g]overnment actors do not want to kill
the goose that lays the golden eggs," and with that mentality, they trust
private entities to self-regulate. 2 2 3However, after a year full of bipartisan
backlash against Big Tech in 2018, the list of growing supporters for data
privacy legislation has since grown steadily.2 2 4 In regard to this growing
support, Neema Singh Guliani, senior legislative counsel at the American
Civil Liberties Union, stated: "You have a bipartisan sense that some type
of privacy legislation needs to happen, and at the same time, you have
industry pushing for it." 2 2 5 The Legislature is not the only branch of
government voicing concerns over data privacy and asking for
guidance.22 6 On September 25, 2018, the Trump Administration's
National Telecommunications and Information Administration issued a
request for comments and described a seven-point privacy protection
outline for favorable outcomes. 2 2 7Subpart A of this Part analyzes Senator
217.

Mind Your Own Business Act of 2019, S. 2637, 116th Cong. (2019); see Ron Wyden,

Consumer Data Protection Act, U.S. SENATOR RON WYDEN OR. (Nov. 1, 2018),
https://www.wyden.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Wyden%20Privacy%2OBill%2ODiscussion%2ODraft
%20Nov%201.pdf. Wyden's discussion draft of the Consumer Data Protection Act seeks to amend
the Federal Trade Commission Act in order to protect personal information. Id.
218. Innovative and Ethical Data Use Act of 2019, INTEL (May 23, 2019),
https://usprivacybill.intel.com/wp-content/uploads/IntelPrivacyBill-05-25-19.pdf;seeInnovativeand
Ethical Data Use Act of 2018, INTEL (Sept. 1, 2018), https://usprivacybill.intel.com/wpcontent/uploads/IntelPrivacyBill.pdf.

219. California Consumer Privacy Act of2018, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100-.199 (West 2018).
220. See infra Parts HA-C.
221.

Paul J. Watanabe, Note, An Ocean Apart: The TransatlanticDataPrivacy Divide and the

Right to Erasure, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 1111, 1123 (2017).
222.

JOANNA KULESZA, INTERNATIONAL INTERNET LAW 58 (Magdalena Arent & Wojciech

Woloszyk trans., 2012).
223.
224.

Watanabe, supra note 221, at 1124.
Lapowsky, supra note 187. The term "Big Tech" refers to "four or five major technology

companies, namely Facebook, Apple, Google, and Amazon. Microsoft is occasionally added to the
list." Naveen Joshi, What Is Big Tech and Why Should We Care, ALLERIN (Aug. 21, 2019),
https://www.allerin.com/blog/what-is-big-tech-and-why-we-should-care.

225. Lapowsky, supra note 187.
226. Id.
&

227. NTIA Seeks Comment on New Approach to ConsumerData Privacy, NAT'L TELECOMM.
INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T COM. (Sept. 25, 2018), https://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2018/ntiaseeks-comment-new-approach-consumer-data-privacy. The Request for Comments outlined the
following desired organizational practices: (1) transparency regarding privacy practices, (2)
individual control, (3) data minimization proportional to the privacy risks involved, (4) cybersecurity

safeguards, (5) reasonable access to and rectification of collected data, (6) risk management
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22
Wyden's bill and its regulatory missteps.28 Subpart B examines Intel's
unique take on the legislative balancing required to regain public trust and
promote innovation.229 Subpart C looks toward the nation's leading
230
example in comprehensive data privacy legislation-California.

A.

The GDPR Has Teeth and Wyden's Bill Has Fangs

"There need[s] to be consequences when corporations don't protect
your data" claimed Ron Wyden, Democratic senator from Oregon, "[m]y
bill will put reckless CEOs in jail if they lie about protecting your personal
information." 2 3 1 Wyden took to Twitter after releasing his discussion draft
labeled "Consumer Data Protection Act," 2 3 2 in hopes of gaining public
support in delegating direct enforcement authority to the FTC under the
Federal Trade Commission Act.2 33 Having incorporated comments and
feedback following the discussion draft, Wyden's next bill, introduced to
Congress as "Mind Your Own Business Act of 2019," calls for increased
23 4
transparency on how corporations sell, share, and use personal data. In
similar fashion to the GDPR, the bill provides for steep penalties for not
only the corporation itself, but also for executives in light of personal data
breaches. 2 3 5According to one writer, "if [the] GDPR has teeth, Wyden's
23 6
it focuses
proposal has fangs-set on the jugulars of corporate heads[;]"
less on individuals' rights and more on expanding the FTC's authority to
regulate data privacy, and the bill also takes after the GDPR in its ability
37
to fine a corporation up to four percent of global, annual revenue.2 Yet,
the bill takes penalties a step further, as it also subjects executives to up
to twenty years of jail time and to fines reaching $5 million per infraction
safeguards, and (7) accountability. Id.
228. See infra Part III.A.
229. See infra Part IB.
230.

See infra Part

m.B.

231. Ron Wyden (@RonWyden), TWITTER (Nov. 1, 2018,1:09 PM), https://twitter.com/RonW
yden/status/1058043486950219776.
232. Wyden, supra note 217; see also Mind Your Own Business Act of 2019, S. 2637, 116th
Cong. (2019) (current proposal).
233. S. 2637 § 7(d)(1); see Ron Wyden (@RonWyden), TWITTER (Nov. 1, 2018, 1:09 PM),
84 6393 56
8 ; Ron Wyden (@RonWyden), TWITTER
https://twitter.com/RonWyden/status/1058043483
46
1172224 ("My bill will
(Nov. 1, 2018, 1:09 PM), https://twitter.com/RonWyden/status/1058043485
protect Americans' privacy and data by: [] Establishing minimum cybersecurity standards[;] Giving
consumers more control over their own information & who gains access to it[;] Requiring companies

to take responsibility for protecting consumers & their info.").
234.

S. 2637

§

5(a)(1) (implementing annual data protection reporting requirements for certain

covered entities); Ron Wyden (@RonWyden), TWITTER (Nov. 1, 2018, 1:09 PM),
https://twitter.com/RonWyden/status/1058043488380448768.
235. S. 2637 § 5(d); Robert Hackett, Sen. Wyden Proposes a CEO-FellingDataPrivacyLaw. Is
Big Tech Readyfor It?, FORTUNE (Nov. 3, 2018, 6:04 PM), http://fortune.com/2018/11/03/privacylaw-tech-ceo-wyden.
236. Hackett, supra note 235.

237.

S. 2637 § 4(1)(A); see Hackett, supra note 235.
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for CEOs who knowingly lie or mislead privacy regulators. 2 3 8 This is great
to hold those that mishandle an individual's personal information
accountable, but what else does it do to alleviate consumer concern over
whether her privacy interests are being adequately respected? 23 9
Acknowledging that holding executives accountable for their actions
is most certainly beneficial, 24 0 appropriate legislation must still afford
consumers more proactive means of protection.2 4 1 One main difference
that distinguishes the Wyden bill from the GDPR, Intel proposal, and
CCPA, 2 4 2isthe presence of a national "do not track" list for consumers.24 3
This "do not track list" would allow American data subjects to
preemptively opt-out within their web browser settings to data sharing,
selling, or ad-targeting based on personal information. 2" Calling for more
individual freedom and control is the purpose of this Note, but this "do
not track" list is hardly the solution needed. 245 The proposal "protects"
privacy only by making it a violation to deny services to those exercising
this right. 2 4 6 In order to effectuate this, Wyden's bill further permits
covered entities to create a paid-for version of the application in order to
offset losses incurred. 24 7 These paid-for versions would best resemble
subscription ad-free models, the costs of which would be capped in
relation to what the entity would have gleaned from sharing user data.2 4 8
The bill, tasking the FTC with the creation of the national "do not track"

238.

S. 2637 § 5(d)(2); see Hackett, supra note 235.

239. S. 2637; see Inside Privacy, Wyden Releases Draft Privacy Bill IncreasingFTC Authority,
Providingfor Civil Fines and Criminal Penalties, COVINGTON & BURLING LLP (Nov. 9, 2018),
https://www.insideprivacy.com/data-privacy/wyden-releases-draft-privacy-bill-increasing-ftcauthority-providing-for-civil-fines-and-criminal-penalties; Wyden Introduces Comprehensive Bill to
Secure Americans' PersonalInformation and Hold CorporationsAccountable, U.S. SENATOR RON
WYDEN OR. (Oct. 17, 2019), https://www.wyden.senate.gov/news/press-releases/wyden-introducescomprehensive-bill-to-secure-americans-personal-information-and-hold-corporations-accountable
[hereinafter Wyden Press Release].
240. See David Lazarus, This Bill Includes PrisonforCEOs Who Failto Take ConsumerPrivacy
Seriously, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2018, 11:10 AM), https://www.latimes.com/business/lazarus/la-filazarus-data-privacy-prison-for-ceos-20181116-story.html.
241. See supra text accompanying notes 188-91.

242.
243.

See infra text accompanying notes 244-53.
S. 2637 § 6; Wyden Press Release, supra note 239.

244. Taylor Amerding, Don't Expect Jailed CEOs, but Wyden at Least Puts Consumer Privacy
on the Table, FORBES (Nov. 7,2018,1:52 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/taylorarmerding/2018/1
1/07/dont-expect-jailed-ceos-but-wyden-at-least-puts-consumer-privacy-on-the-table/#3ba5e550621

5.
245. See infra text accompanying notes 322-25.
246. Wendy Davis, Senator Wyden Unveils Do-Not-Track Law, MEDIAPOST: POLCY BLOG
(Nov 1. 2018), https://www.mediapost.com/publications/article/327473/senator-wyden-unveils-donot-track-law.html; see Amerding, supra note 244.

247.
248.

S. 2637 § 6(b)(2); Amerding, supra note 244; Wyden PressRelease, supra note 239.
S. 2637 § 6(b)(2)(B); Davis, supra note 246; see Amerding, supra note 244;Wyden Press

Release, supra note 239 ("The bill ensures that privacy does not become a luxury good by requiring

companies to offer privacy-protecting versions oftheir products for free to consumers who are eligible
for the FCC's Lifeline program.").
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list, completely misses the mark on giving the power back to
the consumers.2 4 9
Wyden's bill follows the same ineffective opt-out model currently in
use. 250 Instead of following the GDPR's lead in giving the control back to
data subjects via opt-in social contracts, the Wyden bill sticks with the
same faulty FTC endorsed system that has yet to yield any success since
the original "do not track" list was improperly implemented in 2010.251
The proposed variation not only fails to take into consideration the
necessity of rebuilding the trust between those tech companies that have
misused personal data and the public, but it also fails to consider the power
of individualized transactions.2 5 2
Given that the Wyden bill focuses on a "one-stop shop" opt-out
method, Wyden's bill in effect takes all decision-making power away
from the individual, while masquerading the option as a consumer
necessity.25 By only providing a single "opt-out of all data practices"
option, the bill prevents the individual from making an informed decision
about any subsequent data transaction or web usage.2 54 Instead of this
faulty model, consent needs to revolve around a "continuous process of
reassessment, ensuring data practices are reasonable and transparent,
ultimately establishing and maintaining fair terms of business."2 5 5 in
commenting on Wyden's discussion draft, Marco Rubio, a Republican
Senator from Florida, told reporters that he believes "most Americans
view their online behavior as personal property."2 5 6 Without allowing
individuals the opportunity to decide consent transaction-to-transaction,
the Wyden bill fails to give the adequate level of consumer control this
Note calls for.2 5 7
Wyden's bill, with its guillotine-style enforcement mechanisms
against corporations and their CEOs, falls short of becoming the sweeping
249.

See Matt Laslo, CongressIs Enragedat Facebook: "These Guys Are Out ofControl", VICE

NEWS (Dec. 20, 2018, 4:28 PM), htps://news.vice.com/enus/article/ev39xj/congress-is-enraged-atfacebook-these-guys-are-out-of-control (highlighting the comments of Senator Marco Rubio, a
Republican from Florida, who thinks the consumers should have to opt-in for data tracking).
2 5 0. Id.
251.

Davis, supra note 246.

252.

See Chad Wollen, Opt In, Opt Out -Consent Is What It's All About,IAPP (Oct. 31, 2018),

https://iapp.org/news/a/opt-in-opt-out-consent-is-what-its-all-about (stating that consent mechanisms
which revolve around continuous reassessment are more likely to engender more trust moving
forward).
253. See Dell Cameron, Wyden Unveils Plan to Protect PrivateData, Restore 'DoNot Track,'

andJailRecklessCEOs, GIZMODO (Nov. 1, 2018, 11:48 AM), https://gizmodo.com/wyden-unveilsnew-plan-to-protect-private-data-restore-1830153516;
consumer consent should not be a "one-off event").

254.

Wollen,

supra note

252

(arguing that

See generally Wollen, supra note 252 (explaining the importance of a transparent

individualized transaction-based consent regime).

2 5 5.

Id.

256.
257.

Laslo, supra note 249.
See infra text accompanying notes 356-59.
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standard for data protection. 2 5 8The reason for this is because the bill
would not preempt any state privacy laws. 25 9 Generally speaking, it would
fail to alleviate the complications caused by the patchwork of sectoral,
federal, and state laws.2 6 0 In order to best promote consistency and
understanding of the law in the developing field of data privacy, the
adoption of a single comprehensive data privacy law can be the only
1
solution 2 6 -the
vision of which is in line with both the Chamber of
262
Commerce and the Internet Association. 2 6 3With the current haphazard
system of privacy protection, a bill that does not preempt state laws
concerning data privacy results in uncertainty and inconsistency for both
consumers and businesses.264 All things considered, consumers and
businesses "lose when they have to navigate a confusing and inconsistent
patchwork of state laws," 2 6 5 and this is further evidence as to why the
Wyden bill is not a viable option.2 6 6
B. A Tech Giant's Swing at Data Privacy
According to David Hoffman, Intel's Associate General Counsel and
Global Privacy Officer, "The collection of personal information is a
growing concern. The US needs a privacy law that both protects consumer
privacy and creates a framework in which important new industries can
prosper." 2 6 7 Hoffman further explained that Intel's proposal is "designed
to spur discussion that helps inspire meaningful privacy legislation." 26 8
The heart of Intel's proposal, which is sure to be "the most controversial
part of any coming legislation," is the consequences associated with
258. See Dan Clark, US Senator Proposes Data Protection Bill Imposing Criminal Fines and
PenaltiesforBreaches, LAW.COM (Nov. 7, 2018, 4:12 PM), https://www.law.com/corpcounsel/2018
/11/07/us-senator-proposes-data-protection-bill-imposing-criminal-fmes-and-penalties-for-breaches.

259. Mind Your Own Business Act of2019, S. 2637,116th Cong. §14 (2019); Clark, supra note
258; Wyden Press Release, supra note 239.

260. See Clark, supra note 258.
261. See Inside Privacy, supra note 239 (noting that the lack of state preemption departs from
similar data privacy approaches).
262. Id; U.S. Chambers Privacy Principles,U.S. CHAMBER COM., https://www.uschamber.co

m/sites/default/files/9.6.18us chamber -_ctecprivacy_principles.pdf(last visited May 18, 2020).
263. IA Privacy Principlesfor a Modern National Regulatory Framework, INTERNET ASS'N
(Nov. 13, 2018), https://internetassociation.org/files/iaprivacy-principles-for-a-modem-nationalregulatory-frameworkfull-doc.
264. US. ChambersPrivacy Principles,supra note 262.

265.

Id.

266.

See supra text accompanying notes 258-65.

267.

Dan Clark, Intel Publishesa ProposedBill on Data Privacy, LAW.COM (Nov. 9, 2018, 5:15

PM), https://www.law.com/corpcounsel/2018/11/09/intel-publishes-a-proposed-bill-on-data-priva
cy.

268. Id.; see David Hoffman& Riccardo Masucci, Intel's AI Privacy Policy White Paper,INTEL
2 (Oct. 22, 2018), https://blogs.intel.com/policy/files/2018/10/Intels-Al-Privacy-Policy-WhitePaper-2018.pdf. Intel's paper, while specifically directed towards privacy risks associated with
automated data collection, remains in line with this Note's solution as it calls for comprehensive,
technologically neutral legislation that supports the free flow of data. Id.
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noncompliance. 2 6 9Unlike Wyden's bill, the Intel proposal would allow
the FTC to impose criminal fines up to one million dollars, a cap on
executive imprisonment to not exceed ten years, and civil penalties of no
more than one billion dollars for noncompliance.2 7 0 Intel's proposal forces
covered entities' executives into the limelight when they misuse personal
data, but it surprisingly does not require notification to data subjects when
a breach takes place.2 7 1
In fact, Intel's privacy bill does nothing to address what happens in
the event of a data breach.2 7 2 For comparison purposes, the typical state
law regarding data privacy requires notification to data subjects following
a data breach within thirty to sixty days.2 7 3 Not only does Intel's proposal
substantially deviate from the model used at the state level, but it also
pales in the light of the seventy-two hour notification requirement set forth
by the GDPR.2 7 4 Understanding the current atmosphere around personal
data privacy and reasonable consumer expectations thereof, "it would
appear that the Intel privacy bill still falls short of what is now considered
best practices in the data privacy world." 2 7 5 According to the Privacy
Rights Clearinghouse, an institution maintaining a chronology of data
breaches, there have been almost ten thousand data breaches publicly
recorded since 2005.276 Further shedding light onto this epidemic, under
state-level privacy regimes, most industries are not required to provide
detailed information surrounding the circumstances of a breach.2 7 7 The
sheer lack of transparency is the reason why companies hands' have not
been forced to act sooner: "Most companies in this country still have not
embraced a corporate culture where privacy and security are core
values." 278 Most industries simply decide to leave people in the dark as
they are not required to give detailed notifications following a data
269. Sam Bocetta, The FederalPrivacy Bill: Intel Gets the Ball Rolling, CSO (Nov. 27,2018,
6:13 AM), https://www.csoonline.com/article/3324478/privacy/the-federal-privacy-bill-intel-getsthe-ball-rolling.html.
270.

Compare Innovative and Ethical Data Use Act of 2019, supra note 218,

§§

6(b)(1)(B),

(2)(C) (capping criminal fines at one million dollars with ten years imprisonment and civil fines at
one billion dollars), with Inside Privacy, supra note 239 (explaining that Wyden's privacy proposal
carries criminal penalties ofup to five million dollars and twenty years imprisonment, as well as civil
penalties of up to $50,000 per violation or four percent total annual gross revenue).

271.

Clark, supra note 267.

272.

Nicole Lindsey, Intel Proposes FederalPrivacyBill to ProtectPersonalData, CPO MAG.

(Nov. 16, 2018), https://www.cpomagazine.com/2018/11/16/intel-proposes-federal-privacy-bill-toprotect-personal-data.

273.
274.
275.

Id.
GDPR, supranote 4, at art. 33; Lindsey, supra note 272.
Lindsey, supra note 272.

276.

Data Breaches, PRIVACYRIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE, https://www.privacyrights.org/data-

breaches (last visited May 18, 2020).
277.

Herb Weisbaum, Data Breaches Happening at Record Pace, Report Finds, NBC NEWS

(July 24, 2017,10:18 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/business/consumer/data-breaches-bappeningrecord-pace-report-finds-n785881.
278. See id.
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breach. 2 7 9Without the necessary precautions and proper notification of
2 80
compromised data, consumers cannot effectively protect themselves.
The Intel proposal follows the same opt-out model of consent as
Wyden's bill, except that certain data, deemed to be of "high risk," would
require explicit pre-collection consent. 2 8 1Wanting to get ahead of the push
for federal legislation, Intel's purpose for this proposal is to balance
consumers' privacy rights against a framework conducive to tech industry
growth. 2 82 The "risk-based accountability" 283 holds companies to a higher
28 4
standard when data that "is likely to create significant privacy risk" is
collected and provides consumers with the strongest safeguards for this
category of information. 2 85Covered entities seeking to collect and process
such sensitive information will be required to give explicit notice and gain
pre-collection consent. 2 8 6It should come as no surprise that the proposal
from an actor within the tech industry would choose the ineffective optout method of data collection.2 87 Opt-out regimes are notorious for limited
opt-out mechanisms that are both difficult to exercise and intentionally
broad, vague, and hidden. 2 8 8It would also be incorrect to believe it is even
feasible to categorize sensitive high-risk information separately from nonsensitive. 2 8 9This concept is flawed as it fails to take into account the
fluidity of data and its ability to change 2 90 : "The interconnectedness of
data and data processors can quickly turn non-sensitive data into
'sensitive' data." 2 9 1
C.

Calfornia: The Leading State in DataProtection

The CCPA, officially titled AB-375, was signed by the state
governor on June 28, 2018,292 and is one of the strictest privacy laws seen
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Innovative and Ethical Data Use Act of 2019, supra note 218, § 4(f)(2) (classifying
significant privacy risk data to include: (1) geolocation data; (2) biometric data; (3) racial or ethnic
data; (4) religious practices data; (5) "physical and mental health data, including any past or present
information regarding an individual's medical history, mental or physical condition, medical
treatment, or diagnosis by a health care professional;" (6) "sexual life" data, "including sexual
activity, sexual orientation, sexual preference and/or sexual behavior;" (7) genetic data; and (8)
activities where the data subject has a reasonable expectation of privacy).
282. Lindsey, supra note 272.

283. Id.
284. Innovative andEthical Data Use Act of2018, supra note 218, § 4(g)(7).
285. Lindsey, supra note 272.
286.
287.
288.

Innovative andEthical Data Use Act of2019, supra note 218, § 4(f)(2).
See Lindsey, supra note 272.
Tomain, supra note 2, at 2.

289. Id. at 31.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Dom Nicastro, What Is the Calfornia Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 and How Does it
https://www.cmswire.com/customer28, 2018),
WIRE (Aug.
Affect Marketers?, CMS
experience/what-is-the-california-consumer-privacy-act-of-2018-and-how-does-it-affect-marketers.
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in the United States.2 9 3 The CCPA, which went into effect January 1,
2020, brought with it data privacy protections and controller/processor
requirements similar to those seen in the GDPR.2 9 4 It is noteworthy to
mention that the backdrop for this data privacy statute is similar to that in
the EU for the GDPR. 2 9 5 Just as the EU sees data privacy to be a
fundamental right, so too does California see privacy to be an inalienable
right of the people. 2 96 In 1972, California added "privacy" to the list of
inalienable rights in Article 1, Section 1, of the California Constitution.2 9 7
It is clear after observing the legislative history of California's privacy
clause that the privacy clause was intended to be a stand-alone right, not
to be limited by other rights.2 9 8
With some of the most robust data privacy laws in the nation,2 9 9
California privacy law applies to all persons and businesses in California
that own or license personal information. 3 0 0 Enshrined within the
legislation is the intent of the Legislature and the goal of the CCPA is to
provide Californians with the following rights:
(1) [t]he right of Californians to know what personal information is
being collected about them[;] (2) [t]he right of Californians to know
whether their personal information is sold or disclosed and to whom[;]
(3) [t]he right of Californians to say no to the sale of personal
information[;] (4) [t]he right of Californians to access their personal
information[; and] (5) [t]he right of Californians to equal service and
price, even if they exercise their privacy rights. 0o
The penalties for breach or noncompliance pale in comparison to that
of the GDPR, the Wyden bill, or even Intel's proposal.3 0 2 The CCPA's
293.

California Passes Nation's Strictest Data Privacy Law, DUANE MORRIS (July 9, 2018),

https://www.duanemorris.com/alerts/californiapassesnationsstrictestdata_privacylaw0718.ht
ml; Nicastro, supranote 292 (discussing the various obligations imposed by the CCPA).
294.

CaliforniaPassesNation's StrictestData PrivacyLaw, supra note 293.

295. See Nicastro, supra note 292.
296. Compare CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 1 (identifying privacy as an inalienable right), with Charter
of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 8, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 364) 391
(dictating that data subjects have the explicit right to data and informational privacy).
297. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 1 (amended 1972).
298. J. Clark Kelso, Cahifornia's ConstitutionalRight to Privacy, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 327, 433
(1992) ("The committee reports indicate that the Legislature was well aware of the limited extent of

the federal right to privacy and that the federal right to privacy existed only by virtue of penumbral
emanations from other provisions in the Bill of Rights.").
299. Daniel J. Marcus, Note, The Data Breach Dilemma: Proactive Solutions for Protecting
Consumers'PersonalInformation, 68 DUKE L.J. 555, 577 (2018).

300. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(a) (West 2018). See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.80(a) (West 2018)
for the definition of "business" as it pertains to the CCPA.
301.

AB-375Privacy: PersonalInformation:Businesses, CAL. LEGIS. INFO. (June 29, 2018, 4:00

AM), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtmlbill-id=201720180AB375.
302. Compare CAL. CIV. CODE. § 1798.150(a)(1)(A) (West 2018) (capping private causes of
action at $750 per violation or actual damages), and CAL. CIV. CODE. §§ 1798.155(a)-b) (2018)
(capping state civil actions at $7500 per intentional violation if not cured within thirty days), with
GDPR, supra note 4, at art. 83(5) (permitting an administrative fine up to four percent of global,

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol48/iss3/12

30

Shubet: Not All Those Who Wander Are Lost: The Pathway towards American D

2020]

NOT ALL THOSE WHO WANDER ARE LOST

865

private cause of action-stemming from breach or unauthorized access of
personal information-permits consumers to seek statutory damages up
to $750 per incident or actual damages, whichever is greater.3 0 3 To be
covered under the CCPA, an entity would need to meet one of the
following thresholds: (1) have a gross annual revenue of at least $25
million, (2) commoditize the personal information of at least 50,000
individuals, or (3) derive at least fifty percent of its annual revenues from
personal information commoditization. 3 04 Despite privacy being an
explicit right within California's Constitution, 3 0 5 the scope of the CCPA
seems to be set to a different standard.0 6 Whereas the GDPR's scope
encompasses data processors and controllers of EU citizens' data
irrespective of size, 3 0 7 the CCPA's scope is limited to for-profit businesses
in California having also met the previously mentioned classifications.0 o
When the right to privacy of both the CCPA and GDPR is founded based
on California's Constitution 3 0 9and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of
the European Union, 310 respectively, why is it that the scope and territorial
reach of the CCPA are drastically undersized in comparison? 311 Of course,
the wide net that the GDPR casts can have negative consequences on
small businesses, 3 12but this Note posits that a greater danger is having a
law that permits smaller entities to completely disregard codified
privacy interests.3 13
Deviating substantially from the approach taken in Wyden's bill, 3 14
the CCPA brings with it a number of individual rights 31 5 and the nation's
annual revenue), Mind Your Own Business Act of 2019, S. 2637, 116th Cong. § 5(d)(2) (2019)
(providing criminal penalties up to five million dollars and twenty years imprisonment), and
Innovative andEthicalDataUseAct of2019, supra note 218, § 6(b)(1)(B) (stipulating criminal fines
may reach one million dollars or ten years imprisonment and civil penalties arising from the same
acts or incident capped at one billion dollars).
303. §1798.150(a)(1)(A).
304. §§ 1798.140(c)(1)(A)-(C).
305.

CAL. CONST. art. 1,

§

1.

306. See Laura Jehl & Alan Friel, CCPA and GDPR ComparisonChart, PRACT. LAW 1 (2018),
(comparing
https://www.bakerlaw.com/webfiles/Privacy/2018/Articles/CCPA-GDPR-Chart.pdf
regulated parties under the CCPA and GDPR).
307. GDPR, supra note 4, at art. 3. But see GDPR, supra note 4, at art. 30(5) (limiting record
keeping obligations for controllers and processors of less than 250 employees).
308. § 1798.140(c)(1).
309.

CAL. CONST. art. 1,

§

1.

310. Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 8, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J.
(C 364) 391.
311. See Jehl & Friel, supra note 306, at 1.
312. Yuliya Talmazan, What Is GDPR?A Look at the EuropeanData PrivacyRules That Could
Change Tech, NBCNEWS (Apr. 25,2018,10:36 AM), https://www.nbenews.com/tech/internet/whatgdpr-look-european-data-privacy-rules-could-change-tech-n868646.
313. See generally Part ID.1 (clarifying the goal of protecting data subjects' privacy interests,
irrespective of entity size).
314. Mind Your Own Business Act of 2019, S. 2637, 116th Cong. § 7(d) (2019) (focusing less
on data subjects' rights and more on expanding FTC authority to regulate).
315. CAL. CIV. CODE. §§ 1798.100-125 (West 2018). The CCPA provides California data
subjects the right to (1) know whether personal information is being collected, (2) know what
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first statutory opt-in requirement for information relating to minors under
the age of sixteen. 3 16 Be that as it may, the opt-in provision of the CCPA
is only applicable to the sale of personal information.1 7 Generally
speaking, under the CCPA, covered entities are permitted to process
personal information without pre-collection consent (unless the consumer
is under sixteen and the sale of which is the purpose for processing).3
Operating under an ineffective right-to-know, the CCPA only requires
disclosure as to the categories of data-but when it comes to individual
autonomy, affirmative consent is the necessary golden standard.3 1 9
Notwithstanding the failure to carve out a narrower exception,3 2 0 the
California legislature has successfully created an initial framework for a
rights-based data privacy law necessary for our data-driven world.3 21
IV.

THE NECESSARY STATUTORY GUIDANCE IN DATA PRIVACY LAW

The booming marketplace of data commoditization raises serious
privacy concerns, often without consumer awareness of the threat
presented. 3 2 2 The public needs assurance that personal information,
whether shared knowingly or unknowingly, is being appropriately
protected. 32 3To best protect American data subjects in today's datacentric world, a single comprehensive federal legislative initiative must
come into fruition.3 2 4 To this end, Part IV examines the necessary building
blocks of a federal data privacy regime and introduces the language best
equipped to achieve individualized rights. 3 2 5
In order to achieve such legislative goals, a few things must be
realized: (1) a national standard for determining covered entity status,3 2 6
(2) limitations on the collection and processing of personal information,3 2 7
categories of information are collected, (3) know about a business's collection purposes, (4) know
about third-party collection practices, (5) to opt-out ofcollection practices, (6) erasure (albeit limited),
and (7) nondiscrimination in light of any right being exercised. Id As previously mentioned, an
American right to erasure goes beyond the scope of this Note and is not contemplated by the solution

set forth below. See infra Part IV.
316.

CaliforniaPasses Nation's Strictest DataPrivacy Law, supra note 293.

317. § 1798.120(c)-(d).
318. Jehl & Friel, supra note 306, at 1.
319. See Adam Schwartz et al., How to Improve the California Consumer Privacy Act of2018,
ELECTRIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Aug. 8, 2018), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/08/ow-improvecalifornia-consumer-privacy-act-2018.

320.
321.

§ 1798.140(c).
§§ 1798.100-125.

322.

Intel Drafts Model Legislation to Spur DataPrivacyDiscussion, INTEL NEWSROOM (Nov.

8,2018),https://newsroom.intel.com/news/intel-drafts-model-legislation-spur-data-privacy-discussi
on/#gs.m3ESvyMV.
323. Id.
324. See id.
325. See infra text accompanying notes 331-59, 369-76.
326. See infra text accompanying notes 331-37.
327.

See infra text accompanying notes 338-40.
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(3) security by design framework, 3 2 8 and (4) a mandatory distinction
between privacy policies and privacy notices-coupled with affirmative
consent. 3 2 9 A statutory framework, similar to that provided below, would
give data subjects the tools essential to protect the pseudo-property
interests in their personal data.3 3 0
1. Implementation of Fair Information Practice Principles.
(A) Covered Entity 331 - Any legal person over which the FTC has
authority pursuant to: (i) Section 5(a)(2) of the Federal Trade
Commission Act; 332 (ii) common carriers subject to FTC authority under
the Communications Act of 1934,33 notwithstanding Section 5(a)(2) as
described herein; 334 (iii) any organization related to a covered entity by
means of common ownership or corporate control; and (iv) third parties
not related to a controller as defined by Section 1(A)(iii) but which
335
process at the direction and as an instrumentality of said controller,
notwithstanding Section 5(a)(2) as described herein.336
Exception - In order to accommodate the needs and capabilities of small
to medium sized entities, the FTC shall be empowered to enact Rules
regarding entities controlling personal data of less than 5000 data
subjects and that derive less than fifty percent of its total annual revenue
through the commoditization of personal data.33 7
(B) Collection Limitation - All data collection done by covered entities
shall not exceed that which is relevant and necessary in order to
accomplish a specified purpose as laid out in Section 1(E)338 and in
accordance with Section 1(I) herein.33 9
328.

See infra text accompanying notes 344-48.

329. See infra text accompanying notes 353-59.
330. See infra text accompanying notes 331-59, 369-76.
331. See Innovative and Ethical Data Use Act of2019, supra note 218, § 3(c) for a domestic
definition of covered entity. Intel's approach to covered entity status has been adopted for purposes
of this Note. See also CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.140(c)(1)(A)-(C) (West 2018) (conferring covered
entity status when one of the following thresholds is met: (1) gross revenues in excess of twenty-five
million dollars, (2) oversees personal information of 50,000 data subjects, or (3) fifty percent of
annual revenue derives from such data commoditization); GDPR, supra note 4, at arts. 3(1)-(3)
(defining the GDPR's broad territorial scope to encompass the processing of personal data in
connection to controllers and processors within the EU, those entities offering goods or services
within the EU, or the monitoring of data subjects' behavior within the EU).
332. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2018) (empowering the FTC to enforce unfair competition
prohibitions).
333. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2018) (creating the Federal Communications Commission to oversee and
regulate the telephone, telegraph, and radio transmission industries).
334. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2).
335. See Innovative and Ethical Data Use Act of2019, supra note 218, § 3(m).
336. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2).
337. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(c) (West 2018). This language is consistent with the
general theme of the CCPA and Intel proposal in that room is left open for how to best alleviate
pressures of this Act on small to medium sized entities.Id.; see also Innovative andEthicalDataUse
Act of2019, supra note 218, § 3(c)(4). But see GDPR, supranote 4, at art. 3(l)(3).
338. See GDPR, supra note 4, at art. 5(1)(c) (defining a comparable data minimization
limitation); Innovative andEthicalDataUse Act of2019, supra note 218, § 4(a).
339. See infra text accompanying notes 356-59.
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(C) Use Limitation - Covered entities shall be permitted to process
personal information: (i) for purposes to which the individual has
provided explicit consent to processing, unless otherwise prohibited by
law, regulation, or public policy; or (ii) as a requirement of law or
regulation, including request by governmental agency. 340
(D) Data Quality - Covered entities, to the extent reasonable for
purposes of processing personal data, shall maintain complete, accurate,
and up to date records of personal information as required to
maintain accuracy.341

(E) Purpose Specification - Covered entities shall provide notices
required by Section 1(H) describing collection purposes, including both
general and direct notices, made in clear language explicitly stating
intended data use purposes. 342 (i) Time of Specification - The Purpose
of collection must be specified no later than the time of collection unless
otherwise impossible or impracticable. 343
(F) Security Safeguards - Covered entities shall develop, document,
implement, and maintain, whilst taking into account costs of
implementation with the likelihood of integrity failure, appropriate
technical and organizational measures to ensure appropriate levels of
data security:344 (i) pseudonymization and encryption of personal
data;3 45 (ii) ability to ensure the ongoing security, integrity,
confidentiality, and availability of personal data; 34 6 (iii) regular testing,
assessing, and evaluating of technical and organizational security
measures and the effectiveness thereof; 347 (iv) comply with security
measures and procedures set forth in Section1(G).3 4 8
(G) Notification of Personal Data Breach 349 - In the event of a personal
data breach: (i) the controller is to report, upon knowledge of the breach,
to the FTC without undue delay; 350 (ii) the processor shall notify the
controller upon knowledge of the breach without undue delay relevant
information surrounding the breach; 351 (iii) the controller shall, upon

340. See GDPR, supra note 4, at arts. 5(1)(b)-(c) (defining a comparable purpose limitation);
Innovative and EthicalData Use Act of2019, supra note 218, § 4(d).
341. See GDPR, supra note 4, at art. 5(1)(d) (defining a comparable accuracy requirement);
Innovative andEthicalData Use Act of2019, supra note 218, § 4(b).
342. GDPR, supra note 4, at art. 5()(c); Innovative and Ethical Data Use Act of2019, supra

note 218, § 4(c).
343. Innovative andEthicalDataUse Act of2019, supra note 218,§§ 4(f)(3)(B)(iii)(I)-(II).
344. GDPR, supra note 4, at art. 32(1).
345. Id. at art. 32(1)(a).
346. Id. at art. 32(1)(b).
347. Id. at art. 32(1)(d).
348. See infra text accompanying notes 349-52.
349. GDPR, supra note 4, at arts. 33-34. This language, modeled after the GDPR and promoted
herein, is necessary to strengthen trust in the Internet and allow data subjects material information in
light of a data breach. Id.
350. GDPR, supra note 4, at art. 33(1).
351. Id. at art. 33(2).
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knowledge of the breach, communicate without undue delay to affected
data subjects.3 52
(H) Openness - A covered entity shall provide individuals and
governmental agencies with information concerning its personal data
practices: 3 53 (i) General Notice - A covered entity shall provide data
subjects with relevant, actionable, and understandable privacy
information alongside the action for consent set forth in Section 1(I);354
and (ii) Complete Notice - A covered entity shall publish and make
publicly readily available, to be updated on an ongoing regular basis,
full and complete description as to the specifics of personal information
collected and privacy practices used.3 5
(I) Consent - Covered entities are required to receive a clear and
unambiguous affirmative consent to specific data collection. 35 6 Such
consent is to be provided in clear and plain language, to be
distinguishable from consent of other matters. 3 5 7 At any time, a data
subject may make clear to a covered entity, to which consent has been
previously provided to, of objection to further collection and present
process of personal data. 3 5 8 This right to opt-out shall be provided in
clear and unambiguous language in readily accessible locations, whether
359
by internet or physical copy.
Section 1(H) is of great importance to this Note's rejection of the
notion that "idealized consent" is but legal fiction.3 6 0 Privacy policies,
while generally considered essential aspects of data privacy, "are
surprisingly ineffective at informing users or allowing them to express
choice." 3 61 This Note sets out to solve this exact difficulty.3 6 2 Sections
1(H)(i) and 1(H)(ii) of the proposed statute make the distinction between
a general notice, giving consumers readily available and easily digestible
information, and a complete notice, a reasonably full and complete
description of a covered entity's data practices, the form of which most
privacy policies today adhere to. 3 6 3 The distinction to be made is a fine
line drawn between privacy policies, which are intended for regulators
and legal experts in order to showcase compliance, and privacy notices,
352. Id. at art. 34(1). The language of undue delay and its corresponding limitation of being no
later than seventy-two hours after becoming aware is adopted herein. Id. at art. 34(1).
353. Innovative andEthical Data Use Act of2019, supra note 218, § 3(f)(1).

354. Id. § 3(f)(3).
355. Id. § 3(f)(4).
356.

GDPR, supra note 4, at rec. 32; ContraInnovative and EthicalData Use Act of2019, supra

note 218, § 4(f)(2) (choosing the opt-out model of consent for data not otherwise captured by the riskbased analysis).
357.

GDPR, supra note 4, at art. 7(2).

358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.

Id. at art. 21(1).
See id.
See supra text accompanying notes 353-55.
Schaub et al., supra note 205, at 70.
See supra text accompanying notes 353-55.
See supra text accompanying notes 353-55.
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which are designed for users in an auxiliary fashion to compliment the
privacy policies.3 6 4
Section 2 of the proposed statute addresses data subject rights,
mirroring those provided for in the GDPR3 65 and drafted in language
suitable for constitutional permissibility based on language found in the
CCPA 3 6 6 and Intel's proposal. 3 6 7 The following provisions are necessary
because, above all else, data subjects' rights must be safeguarded.3 6 8
2. Data Subject Rights - Covered entities are to maintain systematic and
organizational structures to ensure the following rights of its data
subjects are properly observed:
(A) Right to Know - Privacy notices outlined in Section1(H)369 shall
contain the following information before consent of Section 1(I)3 70 is to
be deemed fully informed: (i) whether personal information of the data
subject is being or will be processed by the covered entity; 37 1 (ii)
description as to the nature and category of such personal
information; 372 (iii) plain language explanations of the covered entity's
data processing practices, including practices of processors or third
parties otherwise included within Section 1(A) of this act;37 3 and (iv)
descriptions of all rights contained within Section 2 of this act. 374
(B) Right to Access - Covered entities are to provide a data subject,
upon request and without undue delay, with the personal information of
the data subject being processed in a commonly used electronic form. 375
(C) Right to Equal Services - American data subjects have the right to
equal service and price, even if they exercise one of the previous privacy
376
rights enumerated herein.

364.
365.
366.

See Schaub et al., supra note 205, at 72, 73.
GDPR, supra note 4, at arts. 12-23.
CAL. CIv. CODE. §§ 1798.100-125 (West 2018).

367.
368.
369.

Innovative andEthicalData Use Act of2019, supra note 218, § 3(g).
See infra text accompanying notes 369-76.
See supra text accompanying notes 353-55.

370. See supra text accompanying notes 356-59.
371. GDPR, supra note 4, at arts. 13(1), 14(1); California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018,
SULLIVAN

& CROMWELL LLP 3 (July 2,

2018),

https://www.sullcrom.com/files/upload/SC-

Publication-New-Statute-Introduces-Privacy-Protections-for-Califomia-Consumers-and-SubjectsBusinesses-to-Potential-Liability.pdf (explaining the right to know as outlined in the CCPA);
Innovative andEthicalData Use Act of2019, supra note 218, § 4(g).
372.
note 371,
373.
note 371,

374.

GDPR, supra note 4, at arts. 13(1), 14(1); CaliforniaConsumer PrivacyActof2018, supra
at 3; Innovative andEthicalData Use Act of2019, supra note 218, § 4(g).
GDPR, supra note 4, at arts. 13(1), 14(1); CaliforniaConsumer PrivacyAct of2018, supra
at 3; Innovative andEthicalData Use Act of2019, supra note 218, at 13.

See supra text accompanying notes 369-76.

375. GDPR, supra note 4, at art. 15; California Consumer PrivacyAct of2018, supra note 371,
at 4; Innovative and EthicalData Use Act of2019, supra note 218, § 4(g)(5).

376. CAL. CIV. CODE. § 1798.125(a)(1) (West 2018). A business is permitted to charge a
consumer a different rate so long as the difference is "reasonably related to the value provided to the

business by the consumer's data." Id

1798.125(a)(2).
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This Act works to strike the proper balance between consumer
control and an environment conducive to tech innovation. 3 Data
processors and controllers have gone largely unchecked-their practices
remain opaque and void of meaningful consumer choice.3 7 8 It cannot be
overstated that "with the emergence of new sources of information,
improvements in analytic methods, and the availability of more granular
information about individual consumers, the need for consumer
protections in this area has never been greater." 3 7 9
V.

CONCLUSION

It is evident through the rapid expansion of the digital environment,
public misunderstanding of data collection and processing practices, and
distrust in the current self-regulated regime that an all-encompassing data
protection law must be enacted. 3 8 0 The public acceptance of the GDPR
throughout the EU can be used to show the international concern over data
protection and a willingness to work toward a uniform system. 3 8 1 It is
wholly impossible to understand privacy independent of society: "The
need for privacy is a socially created need," sociologist Barrington Moore
observed. 3 8 2The need for privacy is born out of societal conflict and the
friction between actors; privacy is the relief that allows individuals to
interact in ways otherwise difficult or impractical. 3 8 3 The Internet is no
longer a luxury, but a necessity; nearly all American data subjects with
means to access the Internet have done so and U.S. legislation has been
slow to catch up to the evolving societal privacy expectations.3 84
California, as the leader in data privacy law, gives Congress the most
significant indicator of the need for legislation: that privacy itself is an
inalienable right 3 85and the time has come for data privacy to be treated as

377.

See infra text accompanying notes 331-59, 369-76.

378.

FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 85, at i, 57.

379.
380.

Id. at 57.
See Shields, supra note 176.

381. See Baraniuk, supra note 187 (arguing that in a fully functioning digital democracy a
corporation should be required to ask the consumer for their data, not the other way around).

382.

Solove, supra note 14, at 484.

383. Id.
384. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 85, at 49; CAMILLE RYAN & JAMIE M. LEWIS, U.S.
DEP'T COM., COMPUTER AND INTERNET USE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2015 2 (2017),
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2017/acs/acs-37.pdf
385. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 1.
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such. 3 8 6It is time for data privacy legislation to come into force before
more individuals fall victim to self-regulated shortcomings.3 87
Aaron Shubert*

386. See infra text accompanying notes 331-59, 369-76.
387. See WILLIAMGADDIS, A FROLIC OF HIS ON 1 (1994) ("Justice?-You get justice in the
next world, in this world you have the law."); Shields, supra note 176.
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